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Abstract
The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and
career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation,
chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in
all equilibria in a sufficiently general class earlier reports are more credible. Further, any report
hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties.
The reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time.
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1 Introduction
Where there is uncertainty, there are analysts – be it stock prices, macroeconomic trends,
elections, or sports matches. Any major event summons numerous predictions of its outcome from
people who claim to be experts in the field. However, not all of these predictions are necessarily
backed by knowledge or understanding of the situation. This raises challenges for both sides of the
predictions market. The expert forecasters must find a way to signal their competence through their
predictions. The public, on the other hand, must find a way to identify informative predictions by
the experts among the quacks’ uninformative opinions.
This paper focuses on the timing of the forecaster’s prediction as a signaling device. We explore
the questions of how the choice of timing of the forecaster’s prediction can signal their competence
and how the amount of information about the state of the world contained in the predictions changes
over time. To motivate the question, consider the case of 2016 US President Elections. Figure 1
demonstrates the ratings of presidential candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton in a span of
9 month before the elections. Consider three different claims that Donald Trump will win, made
in February 2016 (before Republican Party presidential primaries), May 2016, and September 2016
respectively.1 Which of these predictions appears more credible ex post? Which of these predictions
appeared more credible at the time? Would the authors of the early predictions have benefited from
delaying it and, if yes, why did they not? Would the authors of the later predictions have made
their predictions earlier if they had the information? These are the questions we attempt to answer
in this paper.
We present a model of dynamic cheap talk with career concerns. In our model a forecaster, who
is privately aware of his competence, makes a choice of whether and when to make a prediction
about the outcome of some future exogenous event (state of the world). A competent forecaster (an
expert) may have some private knowledge about the outcome, while an incompetent forecaster (a
quack) never does. There is no direct conflict between the forecaster and the observer (the public)
in our model: the forecaster only cares about his reputation, while the observer only cares about
the information concerning the outcome. The conflict comes from within the forecasters market,
with the quacks trying to blend in with the experts in pursuit of reputation (and benefits that high
reputation grants), preventing experts from conveying valuable information to the public.
We discover that this conflict between the quacks and the experts imposes a lot of structure
on equilibrium outcomes. Our first finding is that in equilibrium, the later predictions are less
informative than the earlier ones. Otherwise – if later predictions are more informative – they are
also rewarded with higher reputation by the public, which would make the experts want to delay
their reports. Therefore, the informativeness of predictions must deteriorate over time to incentivize
the experts to reveal their information early, and to prevent a market shutdown when no predictions
are made until the very final moment.
A more surprising finding of our paper is that all predictions in such equilibria, although
1February 2016: https://www.sbstatesman.com/2016/02/23/political-science-professor-forecasts-
trump-as-general-election-winner/,
May 2016: https://www.salon.com/2016/05/23/donald_trump_is_going_to_win_this_is_why_hillary_
clinton_cant_defeat_what_trump_represents/,
September 2016: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/09/23/trump-is-headed-for-a-
win-says-professor-whos-predicted-30-years-of-presidential-outcomes-correctly/
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Figure 1: Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton polling averages before the 2016 elections.
Dotted verticals represent the dates of news articles mentioned in the text. Poll data retrieved from
https: // elections. huffingtonpost. com/ pollster/ 2016-general-election-trump-vs-clinton ,
used under CC 3.0 BY-NC-SA license.
considered informative, are received with solid scepticism by the public. This is in the sense that
making any prediction drops the forecaster’s reputation relative to what he could get by staying
quiet. Thus silence is indeed golden in our model – silent forecasters see their reputation gradually
improving. Those, on the other hand, who choose to make a prediction and take a hit to their
reputation, are gambling for the grand prize that is the reputation bonus for predicting the outcome
correctly.
A typical path of the forecaster’s reputation arising from our model is illustrated in Figure 2. In
this example the event occurs in period 6 and the forecaster starts with reputation b0. The forecaster
makes his report in period 4, and until then his reputation gradually increases. After the report
his reputation drops until the event outcome is revealed, at which point he receives a reputation
premium if his prediction turned out correct and is penalized by low reputation otherwise.
Given everything said above, it is not obvious why a forecaster would ever prefer to make any
prediction, i.e., take a risky gamble at the cost of short-run reputation, when staying silent would
yield a risk-free high reputation. As we show, equilibria of the form above only exist if forecasters
are sufficiently risk-loving or, alternatively, if gains from reputation are sufficiently convex – i.e., if
the gamble of making a report is appealing enough to the quack. Whenever this is not the case,
only “static” equilibria exist, in which all reports are made at some single predetermined date.2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the relevant literature. Section
3 presents our results in the simplest setting. In Section 4 we formulate the general model. The
main results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 contains extensions and alternative specifications.
Section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2Under special assumptions there also exist degenerate equilibria, in which quack never makes any predictions for
the fear of being proved wrong. See Section 6.3 for details.
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Figure 2: Example forecaster’s reputation path.
2 Relation to the Literature
The current paper mainly contributes to two strands of literature: communication with career
concerns and the timing of communication.
The importance of career concerns for informative communication was first argued by Holmström
[1999]. One of Holmström’s original examples illustrates that an expert may be reluctant to
truthfully reveal his private information for fear of making a mistake and appearing incompetent,
preferring instead to herd with public information or reports of other experts.3 Other papers have
argued that some cohort of analysts – or even all of them in some settings – may, conversely, resort
to extreme reports, overstating their private signals in order to separate themselves from “herders”
(see Prendergast and Stole [1996], Graham [1999], Hong, Kubik, and Solomon [2000], Lamont [2002],
Ottaviani and Sørensen [2006b], Mariano [2012]). Either way, it is generally agreed that experts’
career concerns make information transmission noisy.4 Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole [1999], Prat
[2005], Ottaviani and Sørensen [2006c], and Rodina [2017] give various general characterizations of
communication outcomes in the presence of career concerns and their dependence on the information
structure of the game.
Of all papers mentioned above only a few look at the dynamics of announcements. In the model
of Prendergast and Stole [1996] the expert obtains his private information gradually over time,
and his competence determines the speed of learning. They establish that the experts overreact to
early pieces of information in order to establish their reputation for competency early on, while as
time progresses, they become too reluctant to change their decisions and thus underreact to late
information. Predictions of a model by Graham [1999] can be interpreted in a similar way.5 Hong,
Kubik, and Solomon [2000] and Lamont [2002] find a completely opposite pattern in the data: as the
experts become older and more established, they usually make more extreme predictions. However,
timing of the prediction or a decision is never a choice variable for the expert in these papers. Our
3This idea was picked up and greatly extended upon by the literature that followed: see Scharfstein and Stein
[1990], Trueman [1994], Ely and Välimäki [2003], Ottaviani and Sørensen [2006a], Dasgupta and Prat [2008].
4Zábojnik [2001], Ely and Välimäki [2003] and Klein and Mylovanov [2017] argue that if all experts are patient
enough then this noise vanishes and communication efficiency is restored. Backus and Little [2018] show that making
experts admit uncertainty (not knowing the answer) is also not a trivial problem in the presence of career concerns.
5Bernhardt, Wan, and Xiao [2016] observe inertia in financial analysts’ predictions, but their explanation of this
phenomenon does not rely on career concerns.
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paper fills this gap by examining how an expert can manipulate his reputation by strategically
choosing the timing of his prediction.
Keskek, Tse, and Tucker [2014] provide evidence from the field that competent experts tend to
make their reports earlier – so earlier reports are more informative and are perceived more favorably,
– and explain this through preemption mechanisms. We show that competition is not necessary for
this phenomenon to arise.
The second large (and growing) strand of literature this paper contributes to is that on dynamic
communication and, especially, the timing of communication.6 Guttman, Kremer, and Skrzypacz
[2014] provide a notable illustration on the importance of timing in communication. In the context
of dynamic disclosure, they show that the same piece of hard (verifiable) information can induce
different reactions when disclosed at different times. In other related papers, Guttman [2010],
Acharya, DeMarzo, and Kremer [2011], Aghamolla and An [2015], and Gratton, Holden, and
Kolotilin [2017] also investigate optimal timing in the context of dynamic disclosure of verifiable
information. In contrast to these papers, we deal with soft information, which cannot be credibly
disclosed. Grenadier, Malenko, and Malenko [2016] study a setting in which the informed expert
uses timing of his (non-verifiable) report to manipulate the timing of the observer’s decision. A
separate literature explores dynamic revelation of static information and finds, to some surprise,
that even if all agents possess all of their respective information in period zero, allowing for multi-
period communication may sometimes allow for higher payoffs to some or all parties.7 All of
the aforementioned communication models assume direct conflict of interest between the sender(s)
and the receiver(s). Our model of career concerns is different in this regard, since all barriers to
truthful communication stem instead from the conflict within the senders’ market, namely between
competent and incompetent forecasters.8
Finally, our paper takes the market for predictions as given rather than designing it in such a way
as to extract the most information from the expert. A general approach to dynamic mechanism
design when experts have evolving private information has been proposed by Pavan, Segal, and
Toikka [2014]. A sub-field of mechanism design explicitly deals with optimal statistical testing of
experts’ competence (knowledge of a signal-generating process): see Olszewski [2015] for a recent
survey.9 Our paper is different from this literature in that it does not give the observer the power
to design payoffs or information feedback. Instead, it asks the question of whether market forces
alone can enable informative communication.
3 Illustrative Example
This section presents an example that showcases our main results in the simplest setting.
Suppose there are two periods t = 1, 2 and a binary state ω ∈ {G,B}, which is initially not
6For dynamic models of repeated communication, where the sender does not have the choice of timing, see Sobel
[1985], Bénabou and Laroque [1992], Morris [2001], Pavesi and Scotti [2017].
7See Aumann and Hart [2003], Krishna and Morgan [2004], Alonso and Rantakari [2013], Chen, Goltsman, Hörner,
and Pavlov [2017], and Lipnowski and Ravid [2019].
8Curiously, effects similar to career concerns models can be obtained in communication settings with sender-
receiver conflict where the sender’s deceit can be detected with positive probability. For examples of such models see
Dziuda and Salas [2019] and Drugov and Troya-Martinez [2019].
9The most recent contributions to this field include Di Pei [2016], Ginzburg [2019], Smolin [2018], and Deb, Pai,
and Said [2018].
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known to anybody and is publicly revealed in the end of period T = 2. Assume that players do not
discount the future, and that states are ex ante equally probable, i.e. Pr(ω = G) = Pr(ω = B) = 12 .
There are two players: a forecaster and an observer. The forecaster is, with equal probabilities,
either an expert, or a quack. The forecaster privately knows his type, but the observer does not.
The expert has a chance λt to privately learn the state in period t = 1, 2. With positive probability,
the expert also remains unaware of the state, i.e., λ1 + λ2 < 1. The quack never receives any
private information about the state. In any of the two periods before the state is publicly revealed,
the forecaster can send one cheap talk report m ∈ {G,B} to the observer, indicating his prediction
about state ω. The report is not verifiable, i.e., the forecaster’s private information can not be made
observable to the public. At the end of each period the forecaster receives a “reputation payoff”
equal to the probability that the observer assigns at that moment to the forecaster being an expert.
We will look for an equilibrium in which the expert is honest: he reports according to his private
information as soon as he obtains it and never makes an unfounded prediction or reports contrary
to his information (this behavior will be optimal in equilibrium). How would the quack behave in
such equilibrium, and how should the market react to either report and to a lack thereof?
There are five actions available to the forecaster in the game: he can report that the state
is G or B at t = 1, 2 or stay silent throughout. An honest expert plays all five actions with
positive probability. It is immediate then that the quack must do the same in equilibrium – if
either action is only taken by the expert and never by the quack, then following this path gives
the forecaster the highest possible reputation from that point onwards and, therefore, the highest
possible continuation payoff. This would strictly dominate any alternative path of play available to
the quack at the respective period.
Therefore, the quack must be indifferent, in particular, between reporting that the state is G at
t = 1 and t = 2.10 Denote by bt the belief about the forecaster’s competence at the end of period t
in case no report was made in period t; by b(m, t) the belief after report m at period t was made;
and by bω(m, t) the belief after report m at period t was made, and the state turned out to be ω.
The indifference condition between the two reports for the quack is then given by
b(G, 1) +
[
1
2
· bG(G, 1) + 1
2
· bB(G, 1)
]
= b1 +
[
1
2
· bG(G, 2) + 1
2
· bB(G, 2)
]
. (1)
Note that the honest expert is never wrong, since he only makes a report if he knows the state.
Therefore, if the forecaster made a prediction which turned out to be incorrect, he is definitely a
quack: bB(G, 1) = bB(G, 2) = 0.
We have assumed that the expert always reveals his information at t = 1 if he has it. However,
he does have an option to delay his report until the second period if he already knows the state at
t = 1. To ensure that there is no delay, the following has to hold:
b(G, 1) + bG(G, 1) > b1 + bG(G, 2). (2)
Note that the expert’s expected utility only differs from that of the quack in the probability of
guessing the state correctly – the expert knows that his private signal is correct. The two expressions
(1) and (2) together produce our main results described below.
10We will use message m = G to illustrate our results, but all arguments apply equally to either message.
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Early correct reports are rewarded higher ex post. Subtracting equality (1) from (2), we
immediately obtain that bG(G, 1) > bG(G, 2). Early reports must thus be rewarded with higher
reputation to incentivize the expert to reveal his information in a timely manner. Note that this
only applies to reputation after the state was revealed.
Reporting harms reputation. Combining (1) and (2), we also infer that b(G, 1) 6 b1, and by
analogy we can obtain b(B, 1) 6 b1. Therefore, any report at t = 1 must be worse than not making
a report.
Reputation of a silent expert improves. By the martingale property of beliefs, we note that
b(G, 1), b(B, 1), and b1 must average out to b0. The inequalities we just obtained then imply that
b1 > b0: if reporting harms reputation then staying silent must improve it. With slightly more
work, one can also show that b2 > b1.11
Early reports are more precise. The previous observations almost immediately imply that
earlier reports contain more information about the state. Indeed, bG(G, 1) > bG(G, 2) and
bB(G, 1) = bB(G, 2) = 0, therefore b(G, 1) > b(G, 2), since by the martingale property of beliefs,
bG(m, t) and bB(m, t) should average out (from the observer’s perspective) to b(m, t). Because
b1 > b0 the latter inequality means that the earlier of the two reports is relatively more likely to be
made by the expert – which immediately implies that it is more informative than the latter one.
The following sections expand on the analysis of this example in a general framework and show
that the insights demonstrated above are quite general.
4 The Model
4.1 Primitives
Time is discrete and finite: t ∈ {0} ∪ T where T ≡ {1, . . . , T} for some T > 0. An underlying
standard probability space is implied throughout the paper. The probability measure on this space
is denoted by P .
State of the world. There is a binary state of the world ω which can be either good or bad :
ω ∈ {G,B}. The commonly held prior belief that the state is good is P (ω = G) = p0 ∈ [12 , 1).
Initially the state is uncertain; at the end of period T the state is revealed.
Players. There are two players: an observer (she) and a forecaster (he). Both players live for
T periods and do not discount the future.
The forecaster has a binary type γ ∈ {E,Q}: he can be competent or incompetent or, as we
call them, an expert (E) or a quack (Q) respectively. The type is privately known by the forecaster,
but is not known by the observer. The observer’s initial belief that the forecaster is competent is
b0 ∈ (0, 1).
11By the martingale property, b(G, 2), b(B, 2), and b2 must average out to b1, and we know that b(m, 2) 6 b(m, 1) 6
b1 for m = G,B. Therefore, b2 > b1.
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The observer has no actions in the model.12 In every period t she updates her beliefs pt about
the state of the world and bt about the forecaster’s competence. It will prove convenient to represent
these beliefs as likelihoods rather than probabilities, so let ρt = pt1−pt and βt =
bt
1−bt .
At some random time t∗ ∼ F (t), which is not known to anybody, the competent forecaster
observes a signal η∗ ∈ {G,B} about the state, with precision pi := P (η∗ = G|ω = G) = P (η∗ =
B|ω = B). For most of the paper we assume pi = 1, but in Section 6.4 we show that all results
continue to hold in case pi ∈ (12 , 1) given some extra conditions. We assume that F (t) is a measure
with full support on T and that F (T ) < 1, i.e., there is a positive probability that the signal arrives
at any time t and it is possible that it never arrives. We denote the conditional probability (hazard
rate) of signal arrival in period t as λ(t) := F (t)−F (t−1)1−F (t−1) .
The forecaster receives a per-period “reputation payoff” w (βt) which depends on the observer’s
belief about the forecaster’s competence held at the end of period t. We assume w(·) to be strictly
increasing in its argument. As a normalization, we let w(0) = 0. After the state is revealed, the
forecaster receives a terminal payoff wc (βT ), representing the forecaster’s continuation value from
the reputation he has accumulated. We assume that wc (·) satisfies the same requirements that
we impose on w (·). Payoffs are interpreted as coming from some external source rather than the
observer directly. A highly regarded analyst can bargain higher wage from employers in the labor
market, while all of the interested public acts as the observer in forming analyst’s reputation.
Communication. In any period t ∈ T the forecaster can send a report m ∈ {G,B} to the
observer, indicating his prediction about state ω. The report is not verifiable, i.e., the forecaster’s
private information is not ever observable and/or contractible. Additionally, we assume that the
forecaster can send at most one report throughout the game.13
4.2 Timing
At time t = 0, the state of the world ω and the forecaster’s type γ are realized; forecaster’s
private signal realization η∗ and signal arrival time t∗ are drawn from respective distributions.
After that, in every period t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1} the stage game proceeds as follows:
1. If t = t∗ and the forecaster is competent, he observes the realization of η∗;
2. The forecaster updates his belief about the state conditional on observed η∗ (if any) and
decides whether to send a report m ∈ {G,B} to the observer;
3. The observer updates her beliefs about the state p and about the forecaster’s competence b
conditional on the forecaster’s report or lack of thereof;
4. The forecaster receives payoff w (βt);
In period T steps 1 and 2 take place as above, but instead of steps 3 and 4 the following happens:
3. State ω is publicly revealed;
12In the discussion surrounding the model, we assume that she is interested in information about state. To fix
ideas, one may think that the observer chooses a binary action from {G,B} at time T and receives a fixed reward if
and only if her action matches the state – but we do not model this decision explicitly.
13This constraint should not be seen as restrictive since the forecaster receives at most one private signal by time
T .
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4. All players update their beliefs accordingly;
5. The forecaster receives a terminal lump-sum payoff wc (βT ).
4.3 Histories and State Variables
A message history is µt = (m, s) if report m has been made in period s 6 t and µt = ∅
otherwise. A public history hpt is a tuple consisting of the variables that are publicly observable at
the beginning of period t: hpt = (t, µt−1). The forecaster possesses private information about his
type and his private signal in addition to whatever is publicly known. We define a type-γ forecaster’s
private history as hγt = (h
p
t , η
γ
t , t
γ), where ηγt describes forecaster’s private information:
• ηγt = ∅ if no signal was observed in period t or before,
• ηγt = G if signal η∗ = G was observed in period t or before,
• ηγt = B if signal η∗ = B was observed in period t or before.
Variable tγ indicates the arrival time of this information, with tγ = 0 meaning no information has
yet arrived. For quacks we have that tQ = 0 and ηQ = ∅. For experts these variables can be
expanded as tE = t∗ · I (t > t∗), and ηE = η∗ if t > t∗, and ηE = ∅ otherwise. Notably, values
(ηγt , t
γ) are only nontrivial for the expert, thus the quack’s private histories are equivalent to public
histories, and hereinafter we will treat them as such. We also let −η and −m denote the “opposites”
of η and m respectively: e.g., if η = G then −η = B.
4.4 The forecaster’s Problem
At every history the forecaster decides whether to send a report and, if yes, which report to
send. The forecaster’s pure strategy is thus a mapping from private histories hγt to the set of
feasible messages (which equals {∅, G,B} if no report has yet been made and {∅} otherwise, since
we restrict forecaster to sending at most one message throughout the game). The forecaster’s mixed
strategy is, as usual, a probability distribution over pure strategies. To simplify the analysis, the
following restriction is imposed on strategies:
Assumption (Amnesia). At any pair of histories h¯Et , h¯Et which differ only in signal arrival times
t¯∗ < t¯∗ 6 t, the strategy of the expert must be the same.
This assumption requires that after the private signal is observed, the expert’s reporting strategy
does not depend on its arrival time t∗. One may think of this as the expert not remembering when
he received the information (but the information itself is never forgotten). This restriction bans
strategies like "send a report two periods after receiving a signal". This, however, should not be
considered a loss of generality, as the timing of signal arrival is neither observable by anyone except
the expert, nor payoff-relevant for any player, so can be seen as nothing more than the expert’s
private randomization device.
Amnesia together with the fact that only histories with µt−1 = ∅ involve non-trivial choice
of message allow us to define strategies on the smaller space of tuples (t, η) rather than on all
private histories hγt = (t, µt−1, η
γ
t , t
γ). Therefore, we introduce the forecaster’s behavioral strategy
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as rγη (m, t), which denotes the probability of forecaster γ making report m at time t conditional on
having private information η = ηγt and having not made any report prior to t.14 Finally, denote
rγ(m, t) := Eηrγη (m, t). It represents the hazard rate of report (m, t) as perceived by the observer
who does not possess the forecaster’s private information η (but these objects are still conditional
on the forecaster’s type).
The forecaster’s optimization problem is hence as follows: at every private history hγt such that
no report has yet been made (µt−1 = ∅), the forecaster of type γ ∈ {E,Q} chooses a continuation
reporting strategy {rγη (m, s)}s>t as a solution to the following problem:
V γt,η := max
rγη
E
[
T−1∑
s=t
w (β(hps)) + w
c
(
β(hpT )
)∣∣∣∣∣ t, η, µt−1 = ∅
]
(3)
subject to evolution of β(hps) described in the following subsection. The expectation is taken over
all future histories. We also introduce a shorthand notation for the forecaster’s continuation value
from making report m in period τ at history hγt :
W γt,η(m, τ) := E
[
T−1∑
s=t
w (β(hps)) + w
c
(
β(hpT )
)∣∣∣∣∣ t, η, µτ = (m, τ)
]
.
With this notation we have that report (m, t) is optimal at t if and only if V γt,η = W
γ
t,η(m, t).
Moreover, we use W γt,η(∅) to denote the respective value from not making any report until the end
of period T (i.e., conditional on µT = ∅). Finally, as the quack never receives the private signal,
we suppress subscript η when talking about V Qt,η and W
Q
t,η(m, τ), and refer to these objects as V
Q
t
and WQt (m, τ) respectively.
4.5 Beliefs
Two important characteristics of any public history hpt are public beliefs about the type of the
forecaster and about state of the world, b(hpt ) and p(h
p
t ). Recall that h
p
t = (t, µt−1). We will use
this together with the structure of our model to introduce the following labels for beliefs:
b(m, t) := b(s, (m, t)) p(m, t) := p(s, (m, t))
bt := b(t,∅) pt := p(t,∅)
for all s > t. In this notation, b(m, t) is the belief about the forecaster’s type held by the observer
at any time s > t conditional on report m made at time t, and bs is the same belief held in the
absence of any reports. The same applies for the observer’s belief about state, and we will use the
same notation for ρ and β, where applicable. This notation is well defined because once a report
has been made, both beliefs are frozen in place since no further information can be conveyed from
the forecaster to the public.
Finally, we let bω(m, t) denote the belief about the forecaster’s type given a terminal history
hpT = (T, (m, t)) and given that the state was revealed to be ω.
14This is a game of perfect recall, hence by Kuhn’s theorem behavioral and mixed strategies are equivalent.
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4.6 Equilibrium Definition
We are looking for Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game, which consist of a strategy
profile {rγη (m, t)} and a belief profile (b(hpt ), p(hpt )) such that:
1. strategies rγη solve (3) given the observer’s updating rule for b(hpt ),
2. all players update their beliefs via Bayes’ rule on path.
We further adopt three following refinements (in addition to restriction to amnesiac strategies):
(OP) Off-path Pessimism: off the equilibrium path the beliefs are p = p0 and b = 0, with the
exception that extreme belief b = 1 is not updated;
(ML) Message Labeling: rEG(G, t) · rEB(B, t) > rEG(B, t) · rEB(G, t) for any t;
(SY) Symmetry: rEG(G, t) = r
E
B(B, t) and r
E
G(B, t) = r
E
B(G, t) for all t.
Off-path pessimism (OP) only makes it easier to sustain any given strategy profile as equilibrium
because it makes deviations extremely unappealing for the forecaster. In particular, if there is some
PBE with some off-equilibrium path beliefs, then the same profile of strategies and on-path beliefs
would still constitute a PBE when paired with off-path beliefs prescribed by (OP). The exception in
(OP) comes into play only if pi = 1 (i.e., expert’s information predicts the state perfectly) and only
at histories at which the report was supposedly made by an informed expert for sure, but turned
out to be incorrect. The exception says that the forecaster is then still believed to be competent.
This behavior of beliefs can be explained as the limiting case of the model as pi → 1.15
Message labeling (ML) requires that report m is more indicative of state ω = m than the other
report. This assumption is without loss, since at any history hpt we can assign message labels G and
B to the two messages in such a way that (ML) is satisfied.
The only requirement that imposes any actual restrictions is symmetry (SY). It requires that
the expert treats states and messages equally – if he has evidence of state G, he sends report G
with the same probability that he would have sent report B if he had evidence of state B. This
assumption is made for tractability, so that the observer’s belief about state stays at a constant
level p = p0 as long as no report is made.16 We have no reasons to believe that the predictions of
our model would not hold in asymmetric equilibria.
5 Equilibrium Analysis
This section strives to characterize the set of all Weak PBE of the game. The main question that
is answered in this section is as follows: assuming that in some equilibrium reports are only made at
some set of periods S ⊆ T , how do the forecaster’s strategies look and how does the informativeness
of the reports change across different periods? It turns out that all equilibria have quite a lot of
common structure. Proofs of all statements presented in this chapter can be found in the Appendix.
15Section 6.3 discusses alternatives to (OP) in case of perfect signals.
16Silence is informative about the state only if the expert conceals his private signals, and does so differently
conditional on different information. Assumption (SY) explicitly prohibits the latter part of this.
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5.1 Belief Updating
This section specifies how exactly observer’s beliefs b and p evolve given the forecasters’ strategy
profile {rγη (m, t)}.
Conditional on the forecaster not making a report, the observer’s beliefs are updated as follows:
βt = βt−1 · 1− r
E(G, t)− rE(B, t)
1− rQ(G, t)− rQ(B, t) . (4)
Conditional on no report by the end of period T and realized state ω, the observer’s terminal
belief is
βω(∅) = β0 ·
T∏
t=1
(
1−∑m∈{G,B} E[rEη (m, t)|ω]
1−∑m∈{G,B} rQ(m, t)
)
, (5)
which in a symmetric equilibrium reduces to βω(∅) = βT .
Similarly, employing the Bayes’ rule we can derive the observer’s belief β(m, t) following
forecaster’s report (m, t), and the observer’s terminal belief βω(m, t) given forecaster’s report (m, t)
and the realized state ω:
β(m, t) = βt−1 · r
E(m, t)
rQ(m, t)
,
βω(m, t) = βt−1 ·
Eη
[
rEη (m, t)|ω
]
rQ(m, t)
.
(6)
Finally, another relevant belief is the observer’s belief about the current state, pt. As mentioned
before, symmetry implies that in the absence of the report this belief is frozen at its initial level,
pt = p0. Following report (m, t) the belief is updated as:
ρ(m, t) = ρt−1 ·
(1− bt−1) · rQ(m, t) + bt−1 · Eη
[
rEη (m, t)|ω = G
]
(1− bt−1) · rQ(m, t) + bt−1 · Eη
[
rEη (m, t)|ω = B
] = ρt−1 · 1 + βG(m, t)
1 + βB(m, t)
. (7)
5.2 Supports of the Reporting Times
Given γ ∈ {E,Q} and m ∈ {G,B}, define support S := {t1, t2, . . . , t|S|} ⊆ T as the set of times
t at which any report is made:17
S := {t ∈ T | rγ(m, t) > 0 for some γ,m} (8)
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium, any report (m, t) for m ∈ {G,B} is made with positive
probability by a quack if and only if it is ever made by an expert: rE(m, t) > 0 if and only if
rQ(m, t) > 0.
The reasoning behind this proposition is as follows. Suppose that there exists (m, t) such that
rQ(m, t) > 0 but rE(m, t) = 0, i.e., report m at t is only ever made by a quack. Then after report
(m, t) the observer infers that the forecaster is surely incompetent. This renders report (m, t) to be
a dominated reporting strategy for the forecaster – strictly so if we recall that the belief about the
17More generally, the support S is a subset of public histories hpt for which rγη (m, t) > 0 for some γ, η,m. Since a
public history in our model consists of current time t and a messaging history µt, and reports can only be made at
histories with µt = ∅, it is without loss to define the support as a set of times.
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forecaster’s type is a martingale. Therefore, there must exist another continuation strategy at time
t – i.e., at the public history hpt = (t,∅) – that results in strictly positive reputation for at least
one period. No forecaster is willing to play strictly dominated strategies, hence this cannot happen
in equilibrium. A similar logic is in play in the opposite case – if rE(m, t) > 0 and rQ(m, t) = 0
for some (m, t) – except then reporting (m, t) is a strictly dominant strategy for any type of the
forecaster since it yields the maximal possible reputation starting from t for the rest of the game.
Reporting (m, t) is then strictly preferred by the quack to any other alternative, which again gives
a contradiction.18
5.3 Informative Reports and Babbling
If report (m, t) is made in equilibrium, this does not by itself mean that it contains any
meaningful information about the state of the world or the type of the forecaster. Following
Crawford and Sobel [1982], we refer to uninformative reports as babbling.
Definition. We say that report (m, t) is babbling if
b(m, t) = bt−1 (9)
p(m, t) = pt−1 (10)
Report (m, t) is informative if it is not babbling.
Condition (9) implies that the report is uninformative about the forecaster’s type, while (10)
implies that it contains no information about the state.
It turns out that due to restriction that a forecaster can send at most one report, babbling
reports in any equilibrium are organized in a specific structure. This is illustrated by the next
proposition.
Proposition 2. Every equilibrium contains a Godwin point t¯ := min{t ∈ T | V Et,∅ = V Qt } such
that:
1. All on-path reports (m, t) with t > t¯ are babbling.
2. No on-path reports (m, t) with t 6 t¯ are babbling. Moreover:
• at every t < t¯ the expert does not make a report unless he has received the corresponding
signal, i.e., rE∅(m, t) = 0 and rEη (m, t) = 0 whenever η 6= m;
• at t = t¯ the informed expert always reports his signal, i.e., rEη (η, t¯) = 1.
“Godwin’s law” states that as a discussion on the Internet continues for long enough, the
probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches 1.19 At that point the informative
part of the discussion is usually considered finished, and what follows is just babbling. Along similar
lines, Proposition 2 says that in our model all equilibria feature at most two phases: early reports
18One may easily show using the same kind of argument that rE(G, t) + rE(B, t) < 1 if and only if rQ(G, t) +
rQ(B, t) < 1. I.e., a quack stays silent up until time t with positive probability if and only if so does expert. See the
proof of Proposition 1 for details.
19See “Meme, Counter-Meme” (Wired).
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are informative, while the late ones do not contain any relevant information about the state or the
type of the forecaster.
To understand Proposition 2 it is enough to note that by Proposition 1, t ∈ S only if an expert
is willing to report at t. His comparative advantage relative to quack is his ability to acquire private
signals. Therefore, the expert is only willing to participate in babbling if he has no option to
exploit his [current or possibly future] information by sending an informative report – i.e., if the
Godwin point t¯ has passed and the discourse has descended into babbling. Conversely, whenever
an option to make an informative report now or in the future is present (i.e., t < t¯), the expert is
not willing to report contrary to his private information or make an unfounded report. The only
kind of information distortion that he is willing to partake in is delaying information revelation –
but even in this case delaying beyond the Godwin point t¯ cannot be worth it.
It is worth noting that t¯ does not have to be in the interior of the support, so one of the phases
may be absent. In particular, if t¯ < t1 then all reports are babbling, while if t¯ = t|S| then no
babbling takes place in equilibrium. We shall refer to the latter type of equilibria as informative.
Definition. An informative equilibrium is an equilibrium where all reports in the support are
informative.
Note that in any informative equilibrium with support S, it must be that t¯ = t|S|, since the
definition directly implies t¯ > t|S|, and the condition V Et,∅ = V
Q
t is satisfied for t = t|S|.
The next proposition shows that the babbling phase may be safely ignored altogether, and
without loss of generality we may consider only informative equilibria.
Proposition 3 (Babbling Irrelevance). For any equilibrium with support S and Godwin point t¯
there exists an informative equilibrium with the same Godwin point t¯ and support S˜ = S ∩ {t 6 t¯}
such that the two equilibria are:
1. payoff-equivalent for all players,
2. strategy-equivalent on S˜.
Propositions 2 and 3 together imply that any equilibrium strategy profile with some Godwin point t¯
can be obtained from a respective informative equilibrium with the same Godwin point by allowing
for some babbling in {t¯+ 1, ..., T}.
Finally, to simplify the statements of our results, we will also focus on reticent equilibria, as
defined below.
Definition. We call an equilibrium reticent if rE∅(G, t¯) = rE∅(G, t¯) = 0.
In informative reticent equilibria, we then have that for all t ∈ S: rE∅(m, t) = 0 for allm ∈ {G,B}
and rEη (m, t) = 0 for η 6= m. The expert in such equilibria only makes a prediction m if he has
received private signal η = m. The main remaining question is how the quack responds to such
an expert’s strategy. The following subsection answers this question in the context of informative
reticent equilibria, and in Section 6.2 we show how these results extend to equilibria that are not
reticent.
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5.4 Main Results
This section fixes an arbitrary support S = {t1, t2, . . . , t|S|−1, t|S| = t¯} ⊆ T and explores
properties of informative reticent equilibria on S (assuming they exist). Other kinds of equilibria
are explored in Section 6. For simplicity we also assume throughout the remainder of Section 5 that
the expert’s signals are absolutely precise (pi = 1); this assumption is relaxed in Section 6.4.
To start with, it is useful to understand how equilibria look conditional on the support.
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that the the expert only reports when he has already received a
private signal, except maybe at the last point of the support. Assumption (SY) then implies that
if rE(G, t) > 0 then rE(B, t) > 0 and vice versa. Proposition 1 together with the above leads to
the fact that in any informative equilibrium for any t ∈ S: (1) both reports m = G and m = B are
made at t in equilibrium, and (2) both types of forecasters make any given reportm ∈ {G,B} at t in
equilibrium. Alternatively, one may say that S = {t | rEη (η, t) > 0} for any η, i.e., in any informative
equilibrium the support is a set of times at which the expert discloses some of the information he
possesses.
To talk about the informativeness of different predictions about the state of the world, we
introduce the following measure:
i(m, t) := ln (ρ(m, t))− ln (ρt−1) = ln
(
1 + βG(m, t)
)− ln (1 + βB(m, t)) .20
This measure shows how likely report (m, t) is to be sent in state G as opposed to state B. Positive
values reinforce the observer’s belief in state ω = G after hearing this report, while negative values
do the same for state ω = B. Higher absolute values of i(m, t) mean that more information is
transmitted by message (m, t) to the observer, meaning that belief ρ(m, t) moves further away from
ρt−1.
Presented next is the central result of our paper, which describes the informational content
of reports and the informativeness dynamics. All monotonicity statements in this Theorem are
understood in the sense of weak monotonicity.
Theorem 1. Suppose that |S| > 2 and an informative reticent equilibrium on S exists. Then in
any such equilibrium the following are true for both m ∈ {G,B}:
1. later reports are less informative about the state: |i(m, t)| is a decreasing function of t on S;
2. the reputation of a silent forecaster improves over time: bt is increasing in t on S and constant
on T \S;
3. making any report decreases reputation as compared to no report: b(m, t) 6 bt for any t ∈ S.
Theorem 1 starts by stating that in any reticent informative equilibrium with |S| > 2 reports
should become [weakly] noisier over time. This is required to provide incentives for the expert to
disclose the information he possesses. To elaborate, Proposition 1 implies that a quack must be
indifferent between all reports (m, t) made in equilibrium. At the same time, the only difference
20Note that since Bayes’ rule is linear in log-likelihoods, |i(m, t)| shows exactly the “strength” of the signal contained
in (m, t) in terms of it’s effect on the posterior p(m, t) relative to the prior pt−1. That said, our results are not specific
to the particular functional form of i(m, t) and are compatible with any other measure of distance between ρ(m, t)
and ρt−1 which is increasing in |ρt−1 − ρ(m, t)| for any fixed ρ(m, t).
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between the expert’s and the quack’s payoffs comes from their respective probabilities of guessing
the state correctly with their report. Therefore, conditional on the quack’s indifference, the expert
with information η ∈ {G,B} in period t effectively maximizes the net premium for guessing the
state correctly, as given by
∆wη(m, τ) := w
c (βη(m, τ))− wc (β−η(m, τ)) ,
over all reports (m, τ) with τ > t. From (ML) and (SY) we know that ∆wη(m, τ) is weakly positive
for m = η and is weakly negative for m = −η, hence it is enough to consider m = η. Moreover,
Propositions 1 and 2 together imply that in informative equilibria, t ∈ S if and only if an informed
expert reports at t. This means that for t ∈ S we have
(η, t) = max
m,τ∈S,τ>t
∆wη(m, τ)
or, simply speaking, ∆wη(m, t) must be a weakly decreasing function of t on S for m = η. Note
that in case pi = 1, Proposition 2 implies that β−η(η, t) = 0 for all t ∈ S\{t¯}, and therefore
∆wcη(η, t) = w (β
η(η, t)). Finally, as w(·) is strictly increasing, its monotonicity is equivalent to
monotonicity of βη(η, t), which in the end directly translates into that of |i(η, t)|.
The second and the third statements can be shown using the monotonicity of βm(m, t) derived
above, but the main intuition behind them comes from the quack’s indifference between all reports
made in equilibrium. Take some tk ∈ S and suppose that b(m, tk) < btk for both m ∈ {G,B}. Then
it should be that b(m, tk+1) < b(m, tk) for both m, since otherwise any report (m, tk) dominates
any report (m, tk+1) – the former grants higher payoff at tk, higher payoff between tk+1 and T ,
and higher continuation payoff after T . By the martingale property of beliefs, b(m, tk+1) and btk+1
should average out to btk , so in the end we have that
b(m, tk+1) < b(m, tk) < btk < btk+1
whenever b(m, tk) < btk . The same argument extends to all t ∈ S, granting the second and
third statements of Theorem 1. This argument does not preclude monotonicity from going the
other way if we start from the inequality b(m, tk) > btk – but this case would generate a sequence
bm(m, t) that is increasing in t ∈ S, which is incompatible with the expert’s preferences discussed
previously. Finally, the argument above implies that penalties for reporting increase over time: if
tk, tk+1, tk+2 ∈ S then
btk+1 − b(m, tk+2) > btk − b(m, tk+1).
This is exemplified in Figure 3, where the red solid line shows the reputation path of a forecaster
who makes a report at t = 3, and the blue dashed line shows that for t = 4.
Finally, it is worth noting that even the third statement, which is inherently static, requires
|S| > 2. If |S| = 1 (so S = {t¯}) then it is no longer true: one may construct an equilibrium with
b(m, t¯) > bt¯ for both m ∈ {G,B}. In such equilibrium either report is more likely to be made by
an expert than a quack. “Static” equilibria (those with |S| = 1) are in this sense potentially more
informative than “dynamic” equilibria, and allowing for reports to be made at more than one point
in time may actually be harmful to the informativeness of these reports.
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Figure 3: Report penalties increase over time.
5.5 Existence of Informative Equilibria
So far we have discussed properties of equilibria without proving that any equilibria actually
exist, but existence of informative equilibria is not a trivial concern.21 The following Proposition
outlines some necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of informative equilibria, which allow
to understand some driving forces behind their existence and non-existence.
Proposition 4. Suppose w(·) and wc(·) are continuous function. Then
1. For any t¯ there exists an informative equilibrium with S = {t¯};
2. If w(β) and wc(β) are convex and p0 = 12 then an reticent informative equilibrium with
arbitrary S exists;
3. If w(β) = βα and wc(β) = θβα with θ > 0 and α < 1, then no informative equilibrium with
|S| > 3 exists.
Part 1 of Proposition 4 states that at least some informative equilibria always exist. In particular,
there always exist equilibria with singleton support, whatever the single period in the support is. At
this period experts reveal all private information they have accumulated by then, and any forecaster
without private information is also free to make a report in the hopes of guessing the state correctly.
However, the main focus of this paper is on the dynamics of announcements, so we are
particularly interested in equilibria with |S| > 1. Part 2 of Proposition 4 gives a sufficient condition
for their existence, which is convexity of the payoff function w(·) and symmetry of the two states,
p0 =
1
2 . By the continuity of payoffs, the condition on p0 can be relaxed to some extent. All else
equal, for any convex wc(·) there exists ε > 0 such that an informative equilibrium for arbitrary
support S exists whenever p0 ∈
(
1
2 − ε, 12 + ε
)
.
Necessary conditions, on the other hand, are not easily obtainable in our model. The reason lies
in the fact that the payoff functions w(·) and wc(·) are only invoked for a finite number of arguments
β in any given equilibrium. In particular, given some payoff function w(·) and some equilibrium of
the game, we can change values that w(·) and/or wc(·) take almost everywhere without affecting
the equilibrium. This makes necessary conditions difficult to formulate without restricting payoff
21Babbling equilibria, on the other hand, always trivially exist.
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functions to a specific class, which is what the last part of Proposition 4 does. It states that for at
least some class of concave payoff functions the existence of equilibria with large supports (|S| > 3)
completely breaks down.22 Parts 1 and 3 together illustrate that the main hurdles to existence are
tied to intertemporal choice: if the forecaster has no choice of when to make a report then existence
is certain, while allowing predictions to be made at multiple points in time may in some settings
lead to complete breakdown of communication.
The reason for non-existence is connected to the expert’s dynamic incentive compatibility
constraints. This is because t ∈ S if and only if the informed expert makes a report at t, so
he should be willing to do so instead of delaying his report until a later date. This leads to
phenomena described in parts 2 and 3 of Theorem 1. In particular, any report has to reduce the
forecaster’s reputation, so the only reason to make the report for the quack is a gamble for the
terminal reputation: he should be willing enough to make a guess, understanding that it may be
incorrect. A certain degree of risk-loving on behalf of the forecaster is required for such a strategy
profile to constitute an equilibrium. Conversely, if the quack is too risk-averse then strategy profiles
with |S| > 3 cannot satisfy the incentives of both forecaster types at the same time.23 The formal
argument is somewhat more subtle and can be found in the Appendix.
The intuition above naturally leads to the question: do there exist equilibria, given enough
risk-aversion on forecaster’s behalf, in which the quack is too reluctant to make his report for fear of
guessing it wrong? Such equilibria do not require sustaining quack’s indifference between all reports,
so they should seemingly exist under a wider range of parameters and functional forms. In the
current setting the existence of such equilibria violates Proposition 1 and is therefore impossible. In
Section 6.3 we show that after adopting an alternative assumption on off-path beliefs such equilibria
can in fact exist, but only if pi = 1.
5.6 Comparison of Equilibria
In this section we study how the informativeness of the reports depends on the shape of
equilibrium. Simply speaking, we are trying to answer the question of which equilibria are more
informative.
We have two characteristics that describe how informative a given equilibrium is: its support S
and two functions i(m, t) for m ∈ {G,B}.24 Their exact meaning, however, is worth clarifying. The
informativeness measure |i(m, t)| is effectively a signal-to-noise ratio: it shows how noisy a given
message is, conditional on the event that this message is sent. The probability of the latter, however,
is governed by S, so |i(m, t)| alone does not allow to conclude ex ante how much information will be
conveyed at t. Sparser support S means that reports arrive more rarely in equilibrium and it may
take longer for a given piece of information to be disclosed, but it does not necessarily imply that
less information is transmitted (as long as t¯ is unaffected). To elaborate, any piece of information
that is observed by the expert at t′ /∈ S is not lost to the void – its revelation is delayed until
22The jump from |S| = 1 to |S| > 3 is tied to the special features of the Godwin point, which precludes us from
making sharp statements about equilibria with |S| = 2. See also Section 6.2.
23Remember that w(βt) is a function of βt = bt1−bt which itself is a convex function of bt. Therefore, even with
α = 1 the forecaster is still risk-loving, so all talks of risk-loving and risk-aversion are in the relative sense (one may
easily verify that coefficients of both absolute and relative risk-aversion are monotone in α).
24This discussion implicitly focuses on the observer’s welfare. forecaster’s type is not of interest to the observer,
hence g(m, t) is not a variable of interest for us.
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t′′ = min{t ∈ S|t > t′} but it is reported eventually.
Proposition 5 below summarizes our knowledge of how different equilibria of the game compare
to each other in terms of informativeness, given some fixed underlying fundamentals.
Proposition 5. Assume that two reticent informative equilibria exist with respective supports
S = {t1, ..., tk} and S˜ = {t1, ..., tk, tk+1, ..., tk+n}, and informativeness measures i(m, t) and i˜(m, t).
Then |i(m, t)| 6 |˜i(m, t)| for m ∈ {G,B} and all t ∈ S˜.
The proposition says that expanding support to the right increases the informativeness of all
reports as long as the expert makes no uninformed reports. In other words, this says that “extending
the deadline” for reports – in the sense of switching to an equilibrium with larger S – is always good
for the observer. It both allows more information to be transmitted by the informed expert (in
case he observes his private information between tk and tk+n) and decreases noise of all informative
reports (weakly for all t 6 tk and strictly for all t > tk). The intuition behind the latter phenomenon
follows from Theorem 1. Simply speaking, the more reporting options are available to quack in a
given equilibrium, the thinner he spreads over them. A more detailed argument follows.
Ceteris paribus, extending the support to the right (i.e., adding later dates) implies that the
reputation bt of the silent forecaster should improve at the new dates. This makes an option of
staying silent (or making a report at the last point) more attractive to the quack and does not
affect his payoff from making a report. By Proposition 1, the quack should be indifferent between
these options, so to restore this indifference after expanding the support we have to make reports
more appealing to him – which is achieved by prescribing point-wise lower rQ(m, t) in equilibrium,
thereby improving b(m, t) and bω(m, t) and at the same time depressing bt.
6 Discussion and Extensions
6.1 Delay Equilibria
Although Proposition 2 states that the expert only reports at t < t¯ if he has already received a
signal, it is still possible that he may delay his report, making it some time after he has received a
signal (but no later than t¯). If this happens, we call an equilibrium a delay equilibrium. Conversely,
if the expert always discloses his information immediately then we call it a relay equilibrium.
Definition. We call an informative equilibrium:
1. a relay equilibrium if rEη (η, t) = 1 for η ∈ {G,B} and for all t ∈ S;
2. a delay equilibrium otherwise.
Delay equilibria are very special in two respects. Firstly, unlike relay equilibria, they only exist
under knife-edge conditions on parameters. In other words, a generic informative equilibrium is a
relay equilibrium, in which the expert discloses his signals immediately. Secondly, delay equilibria
necessarily possess more concrete properties than relay equilibria. In particular, Proposition 6
describes how the equilibrium properties described in Theorem 1 specialize in case of delay equilibria.
Proposition 6. Suppose that |S| > 2 and an reticent delay equilibrium on S exists. Then in any
such equilibrium the following are true for both m ∈ {G,B}:
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1. the report informativeness |i(m, t)| is constant for all t ∈ S;
2. the silent forecaster’s reputation is independent of time: bt is constant on T ;
3. the forecaster’s reputation is not immediately affected by his report: b(m, t) = bt for any t ∈ S.
Both observations above (that existence conditions and equilibrium properties of delay equilibria
present a special case of those for relay equilibria) stem from a common source. In comparison to
relay equilibria, delay equilibria impose an extra set of restrictions on players’ payoffs: the informed
expert must be indifferent between revealing his signal today and delaying his report until the next
t ∈ S. Given that this should be satisfied for both kinds of private signals together with quack’s
indifference, the set of compatible equilibrium belief profiles shrinks significantly which allows us to
provide a significantly stronger version of Theorem 1 for delay equilibria.
6.2 Informative Equilibria without Reticence
When presenting the main result of the paper in Theorem 1 and in Proposition 6, we restricted
the set of possible equilibria to reticent equilibria. The main result, however, holds without this
assumption so long as we exclude t¯ from parts 2 and 3 of the statement.
Proposition 7. Suppose that |S| > 3 and an informative equilibrium on S exists. Then in any
such equilibrium the following are true for both m ∈ {G,B}:
1. later reports are less informative about the state: |i(m, t)| is a decreasing function of t on S;
2. the reputation of a silent forecaster improves over time: bt is increasing in t on S\{t¯} and
constant on T \S;
3. making any report decreases reputation as compared to no report: b(m, t) 6 bt for any
t ∈ S\{t¯}.
Proposition 7 differs from Theorem 1 and Proposition 6 in two respects: it requires |S| > 3 and
excludes t¯ from statements 2 and 3. The common reason behind both of these changes is that the
Godwin point t¯ differs from other points in S. Its distinctive feature is allowing rE∅(m, t¯) > 0 – that
an uninformed expert makes a report, – while from Proposition 2 we know that rE∅(m, t) = 0 for all
t < t¯. This can generate situations in which statements 2 and 3 are no longer true at t¯, i.e., some
report m may have b(m, t¯) > bt, while silence would decrease bt. This, however, does not affect the
first part of the proposition: the reports made by the uninformed expert at t¯ are uninformative,
and thus only add more noise, amplifying the effect of decreasing informativeness as compared to
reticent equilibria.
6.3 Ideal Equilibria
Informative equilibria with nontrivial supports need not exist with non-convex payoffs, as
evidenced by Proposition 4. A question arises: are babbling and small-support equilibria the only
possible outcomes when forecasters are too risk-averse? The answer is “not necessarily”.
The key to answering this question is assumption (OP). It requires that once a forecaster has
gained perfect reputation it persists forever – even if a forecaster’s prediction turned out to be wrong
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when it could not happen in equilibrium (which is the case if the expert is supposed to report in
equilibrium only if he has the respective signal). This is a limiting case of the model as pi → 1,
i.e., it can be supported by a perturbation of the model in which the expert’s signal is incorrect
with vanishing probability – and thus so are his predictions (see Section 6.4 for a more extensive
discussion of this setting).
However, this is not the only possible perturbation of the model in case pi = 1. One may
alternatively think of a version of the model with the infinitesimal number of “crazy” forecasters
who are not strategic in their reports and just voice their opinions at random times. Since their
number is infinitesimal, Bayes’ rule still prescribes that b(m, t) = 1 for any (m, t) such that
rEη (m, t) > 0 = r
Q(m, t) = rE∅(m, t) with η = m. However, since an informed expert is never
wrong, if such prediction (m, t) turns out incorrect, this would imply that it was actually made
by one of the few crazy forecasters who may be competent or not. This could lead to any belief
b−m(m, t) ∈ [0, 1].
In this section we substitute (OP) by an alternative assumption (OP’) which prescribes the
worst possible off-path belief after an incorrect prediction supposedly made by an expert, same as
any other off-path history:
(OP) off the equilibrium path the beliefs are p = p0 and b = 0, with the exception that the extreme
belief b = 1 is not updated ;
(OP’) off the equilibrium path the beliefs are p = p0 and b = 0.
The alternative assumption (OP’) allows for the existence of ideal equilibria:
Definition. Ideal equilibria are characterized by rQ(m, t) = rE∅(m, t) = 0 for all (m, t), rEη (m, t) = 0
for η 6= m, and rEη (m, t) > 0 for some (m, t) with m = η.
Simply speaking, in ideal equilibria the only reports that are ever made are those by informed
experts; quacks never voice their opinion. This type of equilibrium is enforced by the worst possible
terminal reputation if the forecaster’s report turned out incorrect. For this threat to enforce such
an equilibrium, the quacks should be afraid of bad reputation more than they should love good
reputation in the short term. In other words, the payoff from reputation w(·) must be relatively
concave. While we cannot state the necessity of concavity (see Section 5.5 for discussion of necessary
conditions), we can show the converse: if w(·) or wc(·) is convex then ideal equilibria do not exist.
Proposition 8. Under (OP’), if w(·) or wc(·) is convex then no ideal equilibria exist.
This is the exact opposite of part 2 of Proposition 4, meaning that ideal equilibria are, informally
speaking, complementary to informative equilibria in the sense of existence. On the formal side,
the proof of Proposition 8 contains the necessary and sufficient condition for existence of an ideal
equilibrium with support S, but this condition is not particularly insightful, and for that reason we
do not state it here.
6.4 Imperfect Private Signals
In this section we relax the assumption that the expert’s signals are perfectly informative about
the state and explore the case pi < 1. Note that there is nothing in the intuition behind Theorem
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1 implying that pi = 1 is a necessary condition. As long as pi > 12 , the expert’s signal is somewhat
informative about the state, so his informed report about the state is more likely to be supported
by the ex post evidence than the quack’s random guess. Therefore, the results should continue to
hold.
The proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 continue to hold in case pi < 1 with no further
modifications. Proposition 9 below shows that the remaining results continue to hold as well if
wc(·) is either convex, or at least not too globally concave, and the private signal is sufficiently
precise.25
Proposition 9. Theorem 1, Propositions 4– 7 are true for pi < 1 if either of the following holds:
1. wc(·) is convex;
2. wc(·) is continuously differentiable and there exist 0 < d 6 d¯ < +∞ such that dwc(β)dβ ∈ [d, d¯]
and pi > d¯
d+d¯
.
When describing the intuition behind Theorem 1, we have mentioned that in order to provide
incentives for the informed expert to reveal his private information immediately instead of waiting
for a later date, the premium ∆wη(m, t) for guessing the state correctly should be a decreasing
function of t on S. An important part of the proof of Theorem 1 consists of showing that decreasing
∆wη(m, t) is equivalent to decreasing bm(m, t). The three statements of Theorem 1 then follow
almost directly from the latter statement (using the Bayes’ rule and the martingale property of
beliefs).
The equivalence relation above is simple when pi = 1, since then b−m(m, t) = 0, and wc(·) is
a strictly increasing function. Proposition 9 provides two alternative conditions under which the
equivalence holds in case pi < 1. If wc(·) is convex it holds because bm(m, t) and b−m(m, t) are
scalar multiples of each other.26 The second condition relaxes convexity to just bounded derivative
of wc(·) but the idea is the same: if dwc(β)dβ is bounded so that wc(·) is not too concave globally, and
the signal is precise enough, we can establish the connection between ∆wη(m, t) and bm(m, t).
It is also worth noting that ideal equilibria outlined in Section 6.3 can no longer exist if pi ∈ (12 , 1).
This is because the forecaster who is believed competent with probability one can no longer be
punished after his prediction was revealed to be wrong – he can credibly claim that the mistake was
made because of an incorrect private signal, rather than due to low competence.
6.5 Commitment
Suppose now that the forecaster can commit to a reporting strategy at t = 0 after learning
his type but before receiving any private information. The forecaster’s strategy is not publicly
observable. This modification relates our problem to the literature on Bayesian Persuasion and
information design, since the forecaster now designs the disclosure strategy subject to the constraints
on the information available to him.27
25The exception is Proposition 8, since assumption (OP’) is equivalent to (OP) when pi < 1.
26This follows from the observer’s belief pt regarding state being constant in the absence of reports and the rate
of arrival of expert’s private signal being the same in both states. Due to these assumptions, ratio of bm(m, t) to
b−m(m, t) equals the relative probability of expert having correct versus incorrect information about the state.
27The seminal contribution is Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011]; see Bergemann and Morris [2019] for a recent survey.
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The literature on Bayesian Persuasion has demonstrated that commitment power often allows
the sender to strictly improve his payoff whenever the optimal communication mechanism is
informative.28 In contrast, it is easy to see that in our setting all forecaster’s strategy profiles
that were optimal in the absence of commitment remain optimal even if he has commitment power.
In particular, the quack is indifferent between all reports sent in equilibrium and not reporting, if
allowed in equilibrium. This means that his payoff from any action played in equilibrium is the
same, and (OP) implies that playing off-path actions is no better. Therefore, conditional on the
expert’s strategy, the quack cannot improve by committing to a different strategy. On the other
hand, the expert’s strategy is also optimal given the quack’s indifference: given information η, it is
optimal for him to send the report (m, t) that maximizes ∆wη(m, t), and given no information it
is optimal to wait for information (until at least t¯). Therefore, the forecaster’s commitment power
does not affect the equilibria identified above.
7 Conclusion
The paper presents a model of dynamic cheap talk in the presence of career concerns. We
discover that the competition between competent (experts) and incompetent (quacks) forecasters
imposes plenty of structure on equilibrium outcomes. In particular, we show that to incentivize the
experts – whose reports drive the whole market, – to make early predictions, it must be that early
reports are perceived more favorably by the public than later reports. Perhaps more surprisingly, we
discover that the presence of quacks in the market together with the monotonicity above generates
an automatic penalty for any report: a forecaster who makes a prediction will see his reputation
plummeting, and he will only be redeemed if his prediction will turn out to be correct. This does
not discourage quacks from speaking up, but disciplines their incentives. Moreover, this reputation
dynamics implies that for non-trivial equilibria to exist, forecasters’ payoffs must be sufficiently
convex in reputation, which is the case if, e.g., the premium for being the top forecaster in the field
is very large.
These predictions are novel in the literature, and are driven by us explicitly modeling the
dynamic payoff structure of the forecasters. Our model accounts for both flow payoffs while the
public is still uncertain about the correctness of the forecaster’s prediction, and terminal payoffs
realized after the true state is revealed.
The model can be extended in multiple directions, e.g., to account for competition among
forecasters, or for arrival of public signal in the background. Richer private news processes for
forecasters can also add another strategic layer to the timing decision of the forecaster’s prediction.
All of these are prospective avenues for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is valid for all pi ∈ ( 12 , 1]. We show that rE(m, t) > 0 if and only
if rQ(m, t) > 0 for any (m, t) for any history with b(hpt ) ∈ (0, 1). Together with the fact that b0 ∈ (0, 1),
this will then mean that on equilibrium path we never arrive at a [non-terminal] history with b(hpt ) ∈ {0, 1},
hence the statement is true for all histories on equilibrium path.
Part 1: rE(m, t) > 0 ⇒ rQ(m, t) > 0. Suppose by contradiction that rQ(m, t) = 0. Then b(m, t) = 1,
meaning that WQt (m, t) attains maximum among all continuation payoffs (feasible or not). The initial
assumption rQ(m, t) = 0 then means that either WQt (∅), or W
Q
t (m, s) for some m and s > t attain
maximum, since one of these options should be more appealing to the quack than report (m, t). These
payoffs, however, cannot attain maximum, since bt < 1.
Part 2: rQ(m, t) > 0 ⇒ rE(m, t) > 0. Suppose that rE(m, t) = 0. Since rQ(m, t) > 0, we have
b(m, t) = 0, and hence WQt (m, t) attains minimum among all continuation payoffs. However, since belief
about the forecaster’s type is a martingale from the observer’s point of view, we have either b(−m, t) > 0 or
bt+1 > 0. Thus at least one of these strategies (reporting −m or staying silent at t) strictly dominates the
strategy of reporting (m, t) for the quack, so rQ(m, t) = 0.
Similarly, one can show that rQ(G, s) + rQ(B, s) = 1 if and only if rE(G, s) + rE(B, s) = 1. Indeed,
if for some t we have rE(G, t) + rE(B, t) = 1 and rQ(G, t) + rQ(B, t) < 1, then not making a report by t
grants quack a continuation payoff of zero, while by martingale property of belief there exists m ∈ {G,B}
such that b(m, t) > 0, and therefore report (m, t) dominates the strategy of staying silent. Similarly, if
rE(G, t) + rE(B, t) < 1 and rQ(G, t) + rQ(B, t) = 1, then not making a report by t yields the maximal
continuation payoff, while again by the martingale property making at least some report gives strictly less
in expectation.
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Before we proceed, it is useful to introduce some new pieces of notation which come in handy for further
proofs. The expert’s report probabilities can be rewritten as
rE(m, t) = Eη
[
rEη (m, t)
]
=
p˜0 · zt,G · rEG(m, t) + (1− p˜0) · zt,B · rEB(m, t) + zt,∅ · rE∅(m, t)
p˜0 · zt,G + (1− p˜0) · zt,B + zt,∅ ,
Eη[rEη (m, t)|ω] =
pi · zt,ω · rEω (m, t) + (1− pi) · zt,−ω · rE−ω(m, t) + zt,∅ · rE∅(m, t)
pi · zt,ω + (1− pi) · zt,−ω + zt,∅ ,
(11)
where p˜0 = p0pi + (1− p0)(1− pi), and zt,η = P {ηt = η, µt−1 = ∅|η∗ = η} for η ∈ {∅, G,B}. I.e., zt,η is the
probability that the expert has information η at time t and has not made a report prior to t, conditional on
expert’s signal realization being η∗ = η (or unconditional if η = ∅). It can be expressed recursively as
zt,η = zt−1,η ·
(
1−
∑
m
rEη (m, t− 1)
)
+ zt−1,∅ · λ(t) ·
(
1−
∑
m
rE∅(m, t− 1)
)
,
zt,∅ = zt−1,∅ · (1− λ(t)) ·
(
1−
∑
m
rE∅(m, t− 1)
)
,
(12)
with z0,G = z0,B = 0 and z0,∅ = 1. In any symmetric equilibrium we have zt,G = zt,B ≡ zt, so the
expectations above transform into
rE(m, t) = Eη[rEη (m, t)] = zt
(
p˜0r
E
G(m, t) + (1− p˜0)rEB(m, t)
)
+ (1− zt)rE∅(m, t), (13)
Eη[rEη (m, t)|ω] = zt
(
pirEω (m, t) + (1− pi)rE−ω(m, t)
)
+ (1− zt)rE∅(m, t), (14)
where zt = ztzt+zt,∅ and 1− zt =
zt,∅
zt+zt,∅
.
Given the strategies, we also define the likelihood ratio of reports as
g(m, t) := ln (β(m, t))− ln (βt−1) = ln
(
rE(m, t)
rQ(m, t)
)
,
with ±∞ being admissible values. This ratio summarizes the information about the forecaster’s type
contained in report (m, t).
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is valid for all pi ∈ ( 12 , 1]. We begin with a useful observation:
WEt,∅(m, t) = W
Q
t (m, t) form ∈ {G,B}. (15)
If the expert reports (m, t) before observing a private signal, his continuation payoff coincides with that of
the quack, since they possess the same private information at any such history.
Note further that the existence of a Godwin point t¯ = min{t ∈ T |V Et,∅ = V Qt } is trivial since the required
equality is always satisfied for the last point of S. To see this, observe that any report (m, t) for t > t|S|
yields zero reputation for the rest of the game due to assumption (OP), and is therefore weakly dominated
for any type of the forecaster by staying silent. At the same time, staying silent yields the same time-t
expected payoff to the uninformed (as of time t) expert as it does to the quack, since they have the same
information. This together with (15) gives the result.
Most of the remaining proof is devoted to showing that V Et,∅ = V
Q
t for some t implies babbling in all
further times. This is established in a series of claims. The second part of the proposition is then easily
shown by contradiction.
As a starting point, we show that WEt,η(m, t) = W
Q
t (m, t) for any m ∈ {G,B}, any η ∈ {G,B} and any
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t ∈ Sm such that t > t¯. Suppose the converse – there exist m, t and η such that WEt,η(m, t) 6= WQt (m, t).
Then (ML) and (SY) imply that there can be three cases:
Case 1: rEG(G, t) = r
E
B(B, t) > rEG(B, t) = rEB(G, t) > 0.
In this case WEt,G(G, t) = W
E
t,G(B, t) and, by Proposition 1, V
Q
t = W
Q
t (G, t) = W
Q
t (B, t). Therefore,
WEt,G(G, t)−WQt (G, t) = WEt,G(B, t)−WQt (B, t), which reduces to the equality of differences in terminal
reputation:
wc
(
βG(G, t)
)− wc (βB(G, t)) = −wc (βB(B, t))+ wc (βG(B, t)) . (16)
If rEG(G, t) > r
E
B(G, t) then, by (14) and the expression for b
ω(m, t), the LHS of (16) is weakly
positive. However, due to (SY) we then have that rEG(B, t) < r
E
B(B, t), so the RHS is weakly negative.
The converse also holds, which leaves us with the conclusion that for (16) to be satisfied, its both
sides must be equal to zero. Therefore, βG(m, t) = βB(m, t) for any m ∈ {G,B}, which implies
WEt,η(m, t) = W
Q
t (m, t) = V
Q
t for any η ∈ {G,B} and any m ∈ {G,B}, – a contradiction.
Case 2: rEG(G, t) = r
E
B(B, t) > 0 = r
E
G(B, t) = r
E
B(G, t).
As rEG(G, t) > r
E
B(G, t) and r
E
B(B, t) > r
E
B(G, t), we have that V
E
t,G = W
E
t,G(G, t) > W
Q
t (G, t) = V
Q
t
and, analogously, V Et,B > V
Q
t . Next, note that V Et¯,∅ is, for all t > t¯, bounded below by
t−1∑
s=t¯
w (βs) + P{t∗ 6 t | t∗ > t¯} ·
(
p˜0 · V Et,G + (1− p˜0) · V Et,B
)
+ P{t∗ > t | t∗ > t¯} · V Et,∅,
which is the value of not making a report from t¯ until at least t. By (15) we have V Et,∅ >WEt,∅(m, t) =
WQt (m, t). Second, we have shown that V Et,η > V
Q
t . Therefore,
V Et¯,∅ >
t−1∑
s=t¯
w (βs) +W
Q
t (m, t) = V
Q
t¯ ,
which gives us a contradiction with the definition of t¯.
Case 3: rEG(G, t) = r
E
B(B, t) = r
E
G(B, t) = r
E
B(G, t) = 0 and r
E
∅(m, t) > 0 for some m.
rEG(G, t) = r
E
G(B, t) = r
E
B(G, t) = r
E
B(B, t) automatically implies W
E
t,η(m, t) = W
Q
t (m, t) for any
η ∈ {G,B} and any m ∈ {G,B}, which gives us a contradiction with the initial assumption.
Next we show that WEt,η(m, t) = W
Q
t (m, t) for all η,m ∈ {G,B} with t ∈ Sm implies that report (m, t)
is babbling. Without loss of generality assume η = G. Expanding the equality, we see that
0 = WEt,G(m, t)−WQt (m, t) =
p0 · (1− p0) · (2pi − 1)
p˜0
· (wc (βG(m, t))− wc (βB(m, t))) ,
and therefore βG(m, t) = βB(m, t). It further implies that (7) reduces to (10). In other words, it follows
that reputation should not be affected by the revelation of state after any time-t report.
To conclude that only babbling is possible after t¯ we are left to show that (9) holds for all (m, s) with
s > t¯. Condition (9) is equivalent to g(m, s) = 0. Three cases are possible (since we have shown in the proof
of Proposition 1 that rγ(G, s) + rγ(B, s) = 1 cannot be the case for exactly one γ).
Case 1: s = max{t ∈ S | t > t¯} and rγ(G, s) + rγ(B, s) = 1 for any γ ∈ {S,Q}.
If m is the only report made at s then rγη (m, s) = 1 for all γ, η, which implies g(m, s) = 0. If both
reports are made on path at s, then by the same logic rγη (G, s) + rγη (B, s) = 1, and if g(m, s) 6= 0
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for some m then the report with higher g(m, s) is strictly preferred by either forecaster, contradicting
that both reports occur on path.
Case 2: s = max{t ∈ S | t > t¯} and rγ(G, s) + rγ(B, s) < 1 for γ ∈ {S,Q}.
If m is the only report made at s and g(m, s) 6= 0 then a quack has strict preference between report
(m, s) and staying silent at s (because in either case he gets a degenerate lottery at T , since (10)
is satisfied). This strict preference cannot occur in equilibrium, thus g(m, s) = 0. If both reports
are made on path at s then we can combine the two indifference arguments above to obtain that
g(G, s) = g(B, s) and, consequently, g(m, s) = 0 for all m ∈ {G,B}.
Case 3: s < max{t ∈ S | t > t¯}.
From the previous case we know that g(m, s) = 0 for any on-path m at s = max{t ∈ S | t > t¯}. We can
iterate backwards from there as follows. If s−1 ∈ S then a quack should be indifferent between making
an on-path report at s − 1 and at s, which can only happen if g(m, s − 1) = 0, because g(m, s) = 0
and (10) is satisfied for both reports. Iterating backwards we establish the claim for all t > t¯. If some
of these periods are not in S then they can be skipped because beliefs do not change at such periods.
All of the above proves that only babbling is possible after the Godwin point.
We are left to show the second part of the proposition. First, suppose there exist m and t < t¯ such
that rE∅(m, t) > 0. Then V Et,∅ = WEt,∅(m, t) = W
Q
t (m, t) = V
Q
t , where the second equality follows from (15).
Thus t > t¯ by definition of t¯ – a contradiction.
Now suppose there exists t 6 t¯ such that rEη (−η, t) > 0 for some η ∈ {G,B}. As shown before, it
implies V Et,η = WEt,η(m, t) = W
Q
t (m, t) = V
Q
t for all η,m ∈ {G,B}. Suppose first that t = t¯. Then as
rE∅(m, t|S|−1) = 0 for m ∈ {G,B}, we have
V Et|S|−1,∅ = w
(
βt|S|−1
)
+ P{t∗ 6 t¯ | t∗ > t|S|−1} ·
(
p˜0 · V Et¯,G + (1− p˜0) · V Et¯,B
)
+ P{t∗ > t¯ | t∗ > t|S|−1} · V Et¯,∅.
As V Et¯,∅ = V
Q
t¯ and V
E
t¯,η = V
Q
t¯ , the above expression reduces to V
E
t|S|−1,∅ = w
(
βt|S|−1
)
+ V Qt¯ = V
Q
t|S|−1 ,
which constitutes a contradiction with the definition of the Godwin point. One can similarly show that
rEη (η, t¯) > 0, as otherwise V Et¯,η = W
E
t¯,η(m, t¯) = W
Q
t (m, t¯) = V
Q
t¯ for all η ∈ {G,B} and all m ∈ {G,B}, which
leads to the same contradiction with the definition of the Godwin point as above. Finally, if t < t¯ then, as
rEη (−η, t¯) = 0 and rEη (η, t¯) > 0 imply V Et¯,η > V Qt¯ , a competent forecaster who has received a signal by period
t can postpone his report until t¯ and receive strictly more than the quack which contradicts V Et,η = V
Q
t
implied by rEη (−η, t) > 0.
We are left to show that the expert never wants to conceal his private signal. Assume rEη (η, t¯) < 1. Then
thet expert must weakly prefer to conceal his private signal than to report it. In the first case the expert
receives exactly V Qt¯ , while in the latter he gets V
E
t¯,η > V
Q
t¯ , – a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is valid for all pi ∈ ( 12 , 1]. Let {rγη (m, t)} be an equilibrium strategy
profile. Consider a new strategy profile {r˜γη (m, t)} such that r˜Et,η(m, t) = rEt,η(m, t), r˜Qt (m, t) = rQt (m, t) for
all t 6 t¯ and r˜Et,η(m, t) = r˜Qt (m, t) = 0 for all t > t¯. As strategies coincide on S˜ and all reports (m, t) with
t > t¯ are babbling in the original equilibrium, the following are true:
1. beliefs b(m, t) and bω(m, t) induced by the two strategy profiles coincide for all ω,m ∈ {G,B}, t ∈ S˜;
2. belief sequences bt induced by the two strategy profiles coincide for all t ∈ T .
The latter statement also exploits the fact that S\S˜ is nonempty (otherwise the proposition statement
trivially holds), so it must be that rQ(G, t¯) + rQ(B, t¯) < 1 and rE(G, t¯) + rE(B, t¯) < 1.
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The first statement above implies that any report (m, t) with t 6 t¯ yields the same payoff under either
strategy profile. The second statement states that reporting nothing in any period yields the same payoffs
as well. Strategy of reporting nothing yields the same payoff under {r˜γη (m, t)} as any report (m, t) with t > t¯
under {rγη (m, t)}, since all such reports are babbling. Finally, any report (m, t) with t /∈ S yields the same
payoff under either strategy profile due to (OP).
Everything said above directly implies that if rγη (m, t) is a best response for type-γ forecaster to strategy
profile {rγη (m, t)} then r˜γη (m, t) is a best response for him to strategy profile {r˜γη (m, t)} and yields the same
payoff.
Proof of the Main Result
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 1, we provide some expressions for belief updating that will
be useful in further proofs. Using Proposition 2 and the notion of zt introduced earlier in this Appendix, we
can rewrite the expressions for (4) and (6) in a more explicit form. Proposition 2 implies that for all t < t¯
we have rEG(B, t) = r
E
B(G, t) = 0. Therefore, (13) and (14) together imply that for all t ∈ S we have
β(G, t) = βt−1 · r
E(G, t)
rQ(G, t)
= βt−1 ·
p˜0ztr
E
G(G, t) + (1− zt)rE∅(G, t)
rQ(G, t)
,
β(B, t) = βt−1 · r
E(B, t)
rQ(B, t)
= βt−1 ·
(1− p˜0) ztrEB(B, t) + (1− zt)rE∅(B, t)
rQ(B, t)
,
(17)
as well as
βG(G, t) = βt−1 ·
Eη[rEη (G, t)|G]
rQ(G, t)
= βt−1 ·
piztr
E
G(G, t) + (1− zt)rE∅(G, t)
rQ(G, t)
,
βB(B, t) = βt−1 ·
Eη[rEη (B, t)|B]
rQ(B, t)
= βt−1 ·
piztr
E
B(B, t) + (1− zt)rE∅(B, t)
rQ(B, t)
,
βB(G, t) = βt−1 ·
Eη[rEη (G, t)|B]
rQ(G, t)
= βt−1 ·
(1− pi)ztrEG(G, t) + (1− zt)rE∅(G, t)
rQ(G, t)
,
βG(B, t) = βt−1 ·
Eη[rEη (B, t)|G]
rQ(B, t)
= βt−1 ·
(1− pi)ztrEB(B, t) + (1− zt)rE∅(B, t)
rQ(B, t)
,
(18)
and It is also worth remembering that rE∅(m, t) = 0 for any t < t¯.
In case no report was made in period t < t¯, the belief is updated as
βt = βt−1 · 1− r
E(G, t)− rE(B, t)
1− rQ(G, t)− rQ(B, t) = βt−1 ·
1− ztrEG(G, t)
1− rQ(G, t)− rQ(B, t) , (19)
while the analogous expression for t = t¯ is given by
βt¯ = βt|S|−1 ·
1− rE(G, t¯)− rE(B, t¯)
1− rQ(G, t¯)− rQ(B, t¯) = βt|S|−1 ·
(1− zt¯) ·
(
1− rE∅(G, t¯)− rE∅(B, t¯)
)
1− rQ(G, t¯)− rQ(B, t¯) . (20)
In (19) we use the fact that rEG(G, t) = r
E
B(B, t) due to (SY), and in (20) we use that r
E
G(G, t¯) = r
E
B(B, t¯) = 1
by Proposition 2.
What follows is the proof of the main result, Theorem 1. To avoid duplicating the arguments, we merge
it with the proof of Propositions 7 and 9.
Proof of Theorem 1 and Propositions 7 and 9. First, recall that Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are true for
all pi ∈ ( 12 , 1], and so can be employed in this proof. Further, note that in all babbling periods t we have
i(m, t) = 0, b(m, t) = bt−1 for m ∈ {G,B}, and bt stays on a constant level. Together with Propositions 2
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and 3 this means that it is enough to show the statement of the Theorem for informative equilibria. The
proof is separated into several steps.
Step 1. We start by showing that ∆wη(m, t), which is defined as
∆wη(m, t) := w
c (βη(m, t))− wc (β−η(m, t)) ,
is a weakly decreasing function of t on S given m = η (note that ∆wG(m, t) = −∆wB(m, t)). Suppose the
expert has private information η = G at time t, but has not yet made any report. He chooses a report (m, τ)
with τ > t which maximizes WEt,G(m, τ), where “making no report” is also an available option. Expanding
WEt,G(m, τ), we get the following expression:
τ−1∑
s=t
w (βs) +
T−1∑
s=τ
w (β(m, τ)) +
pip0
p˜0
wc
(
βG(m, τ)
)
+
(
1− pip0
p˜0
)
wc
(
βB(m, τ)
)
,
where p˜0 = p0pi + (1− p0)(1− pi).
A quack is indifferent between all such reports at time t. His continuation value WQt (m, τ) can similarly
be written as
τ−1∑
s=t
w (βs) +
T−1∑
s=τ
w (β(m, τ)) + p0w
c
(
βG(m, τ)
)
+ (1− p0)wc
(
βB(m, τ)
)
.
Given that the latter expression is constant over all (m, τ), the optimization problem of an expert with
η = G becomes equivalent to maximizing the difference ∆wG(m, τ) over all τ ∈ {S|τ > t} and m ∈ {G,B}.
Similarly, an expert who has observed signal B chooses report (m, τ) which maximizes ∆wB(m, τ).
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 imply that S = {t ∈ T | rEη (η, t) > 0} for any η ∈ {G,B}, so since t ∈ S, it must
be that (G, t) maximizes ∆wG(m, τ) and (B, t) maximizes ∆wB(m, τ) across all (m, τ) with τ ∈ {S | τ > t}.
Therefore, ∆wη(η, t) must be a weakly decreasing function of t on S.
Step 2. The second step of the proof consists in showing that for η ∈ {G,B}, ∆wη(η, t) is weakly
decreasing on S\{t¯} if and only if βη(η, t) is weakly decreasing on S\{t¯} (if an equilibrium is reticent then
∆wη(η, t) is weakly decreasing on S if and only if βη(η, t) is weakly decreasing on S). We demonstrate it for
all cases stated in Theorem 1, Proposition 7 and Proposition 9 separately.
Case 1: pi = 1.
This case is obvious, as then w (β−η(η, t)) = 0 for any η ∈ {G,B}, and w(·) is a strictly increasing
function.
Case 2: wc(·) is convex and pi < 1.
Note that since rE∅(m, t) = 0 for all t ∈ S\{t¯} (or for all t ∈ S if an equilibrium is reticent) from (18)
we have
β−η(η, t) =
1− pi
pi
· βη(η, t),
where 1−pipi ∈ (0, 1) because pi > 12 . Take any τ1 > τ2 with τ1, τ2 ∈ S. Then if βη(η, τ1) = x1 > x2 =
βη(η, τ2) we have
wc (x1)− wc
(
1− pi
pi
x1
)
> wc (x2)− wc
(
x2 − x1 + 1− pi
pi
x1
)
> wc (x2)− wc
(
1− pi
pi
x2
)
,
where the first inequality follows from convexity of w(β), and the second is valid because w(β) is
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strictly increasing.
Case 3: pi > d¯
d+d¯
and dw
c(β)
dβ ∈ [d, d¯].
Similarly to the previous case take any τ1, τ2 ∈ S and let x1 := βη(η, τ1), x2 := βη(η, τ2). Suppose
wc (x2)− wc
(
1−pi
pi x2
)
> wc (x1)− wc
(
1−pi
pi x1
)
. Then
0 <
(
wc (x2)− wc
(
1− pi
pi
x2
))
−
(
wc (x1)− wc
(
1− pi
pi
x1
))
<
< d¯ · (x2 − x1)− d ·
(
1− pi
pi
x2 − 1− pi
pi
x1
)
< (x2 − x1) ·
(
d¯− d · 1− pi
pi
)
.
As
(
d¯− d · 1−pipi
)
> 0, we must have x2 > x1.
Conversely, if x2 > x1 then
0 < (x2 − x1) ·
(
d− d¯ · 1− pi
pi
)
<
(
wc (x2)− wc
(
1− pi
pi
x2
))
−
(
wc (x1)− wc
(
1− pi
pi
x1
))
,
which grants the result.
Step 3. We next show that whenever |S| > 3 and an equilibrium on S exists, it must be that
bt1 > b(m, t1) for any m ∈ {G,B} (alternatively, if equilibrium is reticent, then this claim is valid for
any S with |S| > 2). Assume there exists m ∈ {G,B} such that bt1 < b(m, t1). Quack’s value from report
m at t1 and t2 are equal to
WQt1 (m, t1) = (T − t1) · w (β(m, t1)) + p0wc
(
βG(m, t1)
)
+ (1− p0)wc
(
βB(m, t1)
)
,
WQt1 (m, t2) = (t2 − t1) · w (βt1) + (T − t2) · w (β(m, t2)) + p0wc
(
βG(m, t2)
)
+ (1− p0)wc
(
βB(m, t2)
)
.
As w(·) is strictly increasing, and bt1 < b(m, t1), WQt1 (m, t1) = WQt1 (m, t2) implies
(T − t2) · w (β(m, t1)) + p0wc
(
βG(m, t1)
)
+ (1− p0)wc
(
βB(m, t1)
)
<
(T − t2) · w (β(m, t2)) + p0wc
(
βG(m, t2)
)
+ (1− p0)wc
(
βB(m, t2)
)
.
Consequently, it must be that either β(m, t1) < β(m, t2), or βm(m, t1) < βm(m, t2) or β−m(m, t1) <
β−m(m, t2). However, (17) and (18) imply that both βG(m, t) and βB(m, t) differ from β(m, t) by a
constant factor for any t ∈ S\{t¯} (since rE∅(m, t) = 0), so the three inequalities are equivalent. Therefore,
βm(m, t1) < β
m(m, t2), which contradicts βm(m, t) being decreasing on S\{t¯}. In reticent equilibria
rE∅(m, t¯) = 0, therefore the claim extends to t¯ as well.
Step 4. We finally show how the claim in the theorem can be obtained from the previous steps. We
have shown that bt1 > b(m, t1) for any m ∈ {G,B}. Consequently, as bt is a martingale, we have that
bt1 > b0 and b(m, t1) 6 b0 for at least one m ∈ {G,B}. As b(m, t1) 6 bt1 for m ∈ {G,B}, we must have
that either b(m, t2) 6 b(m, t1), or bm(m, t2) 6 bm(m, t1) or b−m(m, t2) 6 b−m(m, t1) to make the quack
indifferent between reports (m, t1) and (m, t2). Again, (17) and (18) imply that all three inequalities are
equivalent, so all three have to hold. The fact that bt is a martingale together with resulting inequalities
bt1 > b(m, t1) > b(m, t2) for m ∈ {G,B} imply bt2 > bt1 . Iterating this argument further, we achieve that
b(m, t) 6 bt and bt is increasing in t on S\{t¯} (on whole S if equilibrium is reticent).
The above proves the second and the third parts of Theorem 1 and Propositions 7 and 9.29 It remains
to show the first part. Note that, by the same inductive reasoning as above, if bt1 > b(m, t1) then
29The statement that bt is constant on T \S follows trivially from (4).
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bt|S|−1 > b(m, t|S|−1). Consequently, it is possible to show that b
m(m, t¯) < bm(m, t|S|−1). Indeed, suppose
the converse. Then to make the quack indifferent between reporting m at t|S|−1 and t¯, we must have
b−m(m, t¯) < b−m(m, t|S|−1). But then
wc
(
βm(m, t|S|−1)
)− wc (β−m(m, t|S|−1)) < wc (βm(m, t¯))− wc (β−m(m, t¯)) ,
which contradicts the fact that ∆wη(m, τ) is weakly decreasing in t on S for m = η.
Finally, remember that for all t ∈ S\{t¯} we have
|i(m, t)| = ln
(
1 + βm(m, t)
1 + β−m(m, t)
)
= ln
(
1 + βm(m, t)
1 + 1−pipi β
m(m, t)
)
, (21)
which is then a decreasing function of t on S\{t¯} as well because ln (1 + x)− ln (1 + 1−pipi x) is an increasing
function of x. For the last two points of S we have
|i(m, t|S|−1)| − |i(m, t¯)| = ln
(
1 + βm(m, t|S|−1)
1 + 1−pipi β
m(m, t|S|−1)
)
− ln
 1 + βm(m, t¯)
1 + 1−pipi β
m(m, t¯) + 2pi−1pi ·
(1−zt¯)rE∅(m,t¯)
rQ(m,t¯)
 > 0,
where the last inequality follows from βm(m, t|S|−1) > βm(m, t¯) and the fact that pi > 12 . This concludes
the proof of Theorem 1/Proposition 9 for general informative equilibria.
We continue by presenting the proof of Proposition 6, which is a special case of Theorem 1/Proposition
9 for delay equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let {rγη (m, t)} constitute a delay equilibrium on S. First, note that if
bt1 = b(G, t1) = b(B, t1) then bt = b(m, t) = b0 for t ∈ S\{t¯}. It further implies that bm(m, t) is constant on
S\{t¯}. Therefore, i(m, t) is constant on S\{t¯} as well, as suggested by (21), so we get all three statements.
If equilibrium is reticent then all these claims are valid for all t ∈ S.
To show that bt1 = b(G, t1) = b(B, t1), proceed by contradiction. If there exists m ∈ {G,B} such that
bt1 > b(m, t1) then rEm(m, t) = 1 for all t ∈ S\{t|S|−1}.30 Due to (SY), the same applies to the other m as
well. Further, if such m exists then, as shown above, bm(m, t¯) < bm(m, t|S|−1), meaning that
wc
(
βm(m, t|S|−1)
)− wc(1− pi
pi
βm(m, t|S|−1)
)
> wc (βm(m, t¯))− wc
(
1− pi
pi
βm(m, t¯)
)
It follows from the fact that wc (x1)− wc
(
1−pi
pi x1
)
> wc (x2)− wc
(
1−pi
pi x2
)
if and only if x1 > x2 whenever
pi = 1 (which corresponds to Theorem 1) or any of the two conditions in Proposition 9 are satisfied. Finally,
(18) implies that 1−pipi β
m(m, t|S|−1) = β−m(m, t|S|−1) and 1−pipi β
m(m, t¯) < β−m(m, t¯), which together give
wc
(
βm(m, t|S|−1)
)− wc (β−m(m, t|S|−1)) > wc (βm(m, t¯))− wc (β−m(m, t¯)) .
The resulting inequality means that informed expert strictly prefers to report his private information at
t|S|−1 rather than at t¯. This is the last step towards the conclusion that if there exists m ∈ {G,B} such
that bt1 > b(m, t1) then rEm(m, t) = 1 for m ∈ {G,B} and all t ∈ S, which is a contradiction to {rγη (m, t)}
constituting a delay equilibrium.
30The claim for all points except the two last ones follows from the fact that bm(m, t) is strictly decreasing in this
case. Furthermore, remember that rEm(m, t¯) = 1 for m ∈ {G,B} by Proposition 2.
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Proofs for Sections 5.5 and 5.6
Proving statements about equilibrium existence and properties requires showing some supplementary
results first. We start with a lemma that shows that delay equilibria can effectively be considered as
modifications of relay equilibria.
Lemma 10. For any delay equilibrium on S with |S| > 3 there exists a payoff-equivalent relay equilibrium,
such that beliefs after the same histories coincide in the two equilibria.
Proof. Assume that strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} constitutes a delay equilibrium on S. Consider strategy
profile {r˜γη (m, t)} such that
1. r˜Eη (m, t¯) = rEη (m, t¯) and r˜Q(m, t¯) = rQ(m, t¯) for η ∈ {∅, G,B} and m ∈ {G,B};
2. r˜Eη (m, t) = 1 for m = η, r˜Eη (m, t) = 0 for m 6= η, and r˜Q(m, t) = r
Q(m,t)
rEm(m,t)
for all t ∈ S\{t¯}.
By Proposition 6 a strategy profile constitutes a delay equilibrium on S with |S| > 3 only if bt = b(G, t) =
b(B, t) = b0 for all t ∈ S\{t¯}. Therefore rQ(m, t) = rE(m, t) for m ∈ {G,B} and all t ∈ S\{t¯}.
Consequently, r˜Q(m, t) = r
Q(m,t)
rEm(m,t)
< r
Q(m,t)
rE(m,t)
= 1, that is r˜Eη (m, t) = 1 is indeed a well-defined profile
of strategies. Moreover, profile {r˜γη (m, t)} induces the same beliefs as profile {rγη (m, t)} after the same
histories, and therefore also constitutes an equilibrium. At the same time, this equilibrium is a relay one
because rEG(G,m) = r
E
B(B,m) = 1.
Next we proceed with describing which conditions are necessary for a given profile of strategies {rγη (m, t)}
to constitute a relay equilibrium. We consider two sub-cases depending on whether not making a report by
t¯ is on equilibrium path.
Lemma 11. Suppose that beliefs β(m, t) and βω(m, t) for all t ∈ S are given by (17) and (18) respectively,
while βt is given by (19) for all t < t¯. Moreover, let strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} be such that: (1) rEη (η, t) = 1
for all η ∈ {G,B} and all t ∈ S, and (2) r∅(m, t) = 0 for all m ∈ {G,B} and all t ∈ S\{t¯}.
1. Strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} with rE∅(G, t¯) + rE∅(B, t¯) = 1 constitutes a relay equilibrium on S only if
WQt1 (m, t) = W¯ for all t ∈ S and m ∈ {G,B} for some W¯ ∈ R+,
rQ(G, t¯) + rQ(B, t¯) = 1.
(22)
Moreover, there exists at most one solution to this system, and if w(β) = βα and wc(β) = θ · βα then
this solution always exists.
2. If (20) holds then strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} with rE∅(G, t¯)+rE∅(B, t¯) < 1 constitutes a relay equilibrium
on S only if
WQt1 (m, t) = W
Q
t1 (∅) = W¯ for all t ∈ S and m ∈ {G,B} for some W¯ ∈ R+. (23)
Moreover, there exists at most one solution to this system, and if w(β) = βα and wc(β) = θ · βα then
this solution always exists.
Proof. By Proposition 1, a strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium only if WQt1 (m, t) is constant for all
t ∈ S and m ∈ {G,B}. Additionally, if rE∅(G, t¯) + rE∅(B, t¯) < 1 – that is, not making a report by t¯ is an
on-path action – the value that the quack receives from making any report must be equal to value from
making no report.
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The proof of Proposition 1 argued that rE(G, t¯) + rE(B, t¯) = 1 implies rQ(G, t¯) + rQ(B, t¯) = 1.
From Proposition 2 we know that rEη (η, t¯) = 1, and therefore rE(G, t¯) + rE(B, t¯) = 1 is equivalent to
rE∅(G, t¯) + r
E
∅(B, t¯) = 1. This completes the proof of the first parts of both statements.
To prove the uniqueness of solutions to respective systems, assume that there exist two different strategy
profiles {rγη (m, t)}, {r˜γη (m, t)}, values of making a report WQt (m, τ), W˜Qt (m, τ), and belief profiles b, b˜ that
solve either system (22) or system (23). Then rQ(G, t1) 6= r˜Q(G, t1), as otherwise equilibria coincide. Indeed,
strategies rEη (m, t) = r˜Eη (m, t) for all t ∈ S. Therefore, if rQ(G, t1) = r˜Q(G, t1) then b(G, t1) = b˜(G, t1) and
bω(G, t1) = b˜
ω(G, t1), meaning that W
Q
t1 (G, t1) = W˜
Q
t1 (G, t1). By the first two parts of the lemma, the
quack’s values WQt1 (m, t) should then coincide for all m and t ∈ S, which implies rQ(m, t) = r˜Q(m, t) – a
contradiction.
Without loss, assume rQ(G, t1) > r˜Q(G, t1). Then since W
Q
t1 (G, t1) = W
Q
t1 (B, t1) and W˜
Q
t1 (G, t1) =
W˜Qt1 (B, t1), we must have r
Q(B, t1) > r˜
Q(B, t1) as well. By (19) this implies that bt1 > b˜t1 . Consequently,
rQ(G, t2) > r˜
Q(G, t2) and rQ(B, t2) > r˜Q(B, t2) because W
Q
t1 (m, t1) = W
Q
t1 (m, t2) and W˜
Q
t1 (m, t1) =
W˜Qt1 (m, t2) for m ∈ {G,B}. Iterating this logic further, we obtain that rQ(G, t¯) + rQ(B, t¯) > r˜Q(G, t¯) +
r˜Q(B, t¯). In the context of the first part of the lemma (case rE∅(G, t¯) + rE∅(B, t¯) = 1), it clearly violates
rQ(G, t¯) + rQ(B, t¯) = r˜Q(G, t¯) + r˜Q(B, t¯) = 1. In the context of the second part, it implies bt¯ > b˜t¯,
and therefore WQt1 (∅) > W˜
Q
t1 (∅) because the payoff that the quack receives from staying silent is point-
wise lower in the former equilibrium. At the same time, because rQ(G, t1) > r˜Q(G, t1), we must have
WQt1 (G, t1) < W˜
Q
t1 (G, t1). As in the second case W
Q
t1 (∅) = W
Q
t1 (G, t1) and W˜
Q
t1 (∅) = W˜
Q
t1 (G, t1), we arrive
to a contradiction.
Finally, to prove existence of a solution for w(β) = βα and wc(β) = θ · βα assume first that
rE∅(G, t¯) + r
E
∅(B, t¯) = 1. The first part of the lemma then implies that we have W
Q
t¯ (G, t¯) = W
Q
t¯ (B, t¯)
and rQ(G, t¯) + rQ(B, t¯) = 1. We can then explicitly solve this system of equations for rQ(G, t¯) and rQ(B, t¯)
as functions of rE∅(G, t¯) and rE∅(B, t¯). The resulting expressions are
rQ(G, t¯) =
MG
(
rE∅ (G, t¯)
) 1
α
MG
(
rE∅ (G, t¯)
) 1
α +MB
(
rE∅ (B, t¯)
) 1
α
,
rQ(B, t¯) =
MB
(
rE∅ (B, t¯)
) 1
α
MG
(
rE∅ (G, t¯)
) 1
α +MB
(
rE∅ (B, t¯)
) 1
α
,
(24)
where
MG(x) := (T − t¯) · (p˜0zt¯ + (1− zt¯)x)α + θ · p0 (pizt¯ + (1− zt¯)x)α + θ · (1− p0) ((1− pi) zt¯ + (1− zt¯)x)α ,
MB(x) := (T − t¯) · ((1− p˜0) zt¯ + (1− zt¯)x)α + θ · p0 ((1− pi) zt¯ + (1− zt¯)x)α + θ · (1− p0) (pizt¯ + (1− zt¯)x)α .
In case rE∅(G, t¯) + rE∅(B, t¯) < 1, the second part of the lemma prescribes that W
Q
t¯ (G, t¯) = W
Q
t¯ (B, t¯) =
WQt¯ (∅). Analogously to the previous case, we can solve for r
Q(G, t¯) and rQ(B, t¯) as functions of rE∅(G, t¯)
and rE∅(B, t¯) and obtain
rQ(G, t¯) =
MG
(
rE∅ (G, t¯)
) 1
α
MG
(
rE∅ (G, t¯)
) 1
α +MB
(
rE∅ (B, t¯)
) 1
α + (1− zt¯) · (T − t¯+ θ)
1
α · (1− rE∅ (G, t¯)− rE∅ (B, t¯)) ,
rQ(B, t¯) =
MB
(
rE∅ (B, t¯)
) 1
α
MG
(
rE∅ (G, t¯)
) 1
α +MB
(
rE∅ (B, t¯)
) 1
α + (1− zt¯) · (T − t¯+ θ)
1
α · (1− rE∅ (G, t¯)− rE∅ (B, t¯)) ,
(25)
Note that expressions in (24) can be obtained from the respective ones in (25) substituting rE∅(G, t¯) +
rE∅(B, t¯) = 1. Therefore, without loss we can restrict ourselves to the case rE∅(G, t¯) + rE∅(B, t¯) < 1 and only
consider strategy profile given by (25). All above proves existence of the solution for t = t¯.
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We establish existence for all t ∈ S\{t¯} proceeding by backward induction. Consider system
WQt|S|−1(G, t|S|−1) = W
Q
t|S|−1(B, t|S|−1) = W
Q
t|S|−1(G, t¯)
We next show that this system of equations always has a solution. Consider the following auxiliary system.
For any given c > 0 assume that rQ(G, t|S|−1) + rQ(B, t|S|−1) = c and consider equation
WQt|S|−1(G, t|S|−1) = W
Q
t|S|−1(B, t|S|−1).
Then if rQ(G, t|S|−1) approaches zero, the LHS approaches +∞ while the RHS is constant. Similarly,
the RHS strictly dominates the LHS when rQ(G, t|S|−1) = c. Moreover the LHS is strictly decreasing in
rQ(G, t|S|−1), while the RHS is strictly increasing in it. Therefore by the Intermediate Value Theorem for a
given c > 0 there exists a unique pair rQ(G, t|S|−1), rQ(B, t|S|−1) such that rQ(G, t|S|−1) + rQ(B, t|S|−1) = c
and WQt|S|−1(G, t|S|−1) = W
Q
t|S|−1(B, t|S|−1). Also note that both r
Q(G, t|S|−1) and rQ(B, t|S|−1) are strictly
increasing in c. Further for the same c > 0 still assume that rQ(G, t|S|−1) + rQ(B, t|S|−1) = c and consider
equality
WQt|S|−1(G, t|S|−1) = W
Q
t|S|−1(G, t¯)
as an equation in c. The RHS of it is a strictly increasing function of c which approaches +∞ when c
approaches 1. As established before, the LHS of it is a strictly decreasing function of c (because rQ(G, t|S|−1)
is strictly increasing in c), which approaches +∞ when c approaches zero. Therefore there exist unique
rQ(G, t|S|−1) and rQ(B, t|S|−1) such that W
Q
t|S|−1(G, t|S|−1) = W
Q
t|S|−1(B, t|S|−1) = W
Q
t|S|−1(G, t¯), which
finishes the proof.
The bottom line of the lemma above is that for a given tuple
[S, rE∅(G, t¯), rE∅(B, t¯)], a strategy profile that
constitutes a relay equilibrium is a unique solution to a particular system of algebraic equations. Moreover,
solution to this system always exists if w(β) = βα and wc(β) = θ · βα. Representing a strategy profile
as a solution to a system of equations allows us to compare equilibrium strategies and, therefore, report
informativeness across different relay equilibria employing the arguments similar to the Implicit Function
Theorem.
In all further lemmas it is assumed that strategy profile rγη (m, t) and all associated equilibrium objects
such as values WQt (m, τ), belief profiles b, p, and informativeness measures i(m, t) constitute a solution to
either system (22) or system (23) for a given tuple
[S, rE∅(G, t¯), rE∅(B, t¯)], and therefore are understood as
functions of
[S, rE∅(G, t¯), rE∅(B, t¯)].
The next lemma establishes that whenever w(β) = βα and wc(β) = θ · βα, it is true that strategies
that constitute a solution to either system (22) or system (23) are continuously differentiable in rE∅(G, t¯)
and rE∅(B, t¯) at rE∅(G, t¯) + rE∅(B, t¯) = 1. The same will then be true of all associated equilibrium objects
WQt (m, τ), b and i(m, t), as they all are continuously differentiable functions of the strategies. The statement
of this lemma is valid for any continuously differentiable w(·), but the statement for this particular functional
form is enough for the needs of the paper and is significantly easier to prove. Lemma 12 allows us to further
omit the consideration of the case rE∅(G, t¯) + rE∅(B, t¯) = 1 and without loss assume in further propositions
that rE∅(G, t¯) + rE∅(B, t¯) < 1.
Lemma 12. Suppose w(β) = βα and wc(β) = θ · βα, and strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} solves either system
(22) or system (23). Then rγη (m, t) is a continuously differentiable function of rE∅(G, t¯) and rE∅(B, t¯) for all
rE∅(G, t¯) + r
E
∅(B, t¯) 6 1.
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Proof. First note that rγη (m, t) exists by Lemma 11. Next, the strategy profile for the expert is fixed by
the premise of Lemma 11 and is therefore a continuously differentiable function of rE∅(G, t¯) and rE∅(B, t¯).
Therefore we are left to establish that rQ(m, t) is a continuously differentiable function of rE∅(G, t¯) and
rE∅(B, t¯) for all m ∈ {G,B} and all t ∈ S. As expressions in (24) coincide with the ones in (25) for
rE∅(G, t¯) + r
E
∅(B, t¯) = 1, without loss, we restrict ourselves to the case rE∅(G, t¯) + rE∅(B, t¯) < 1. Both
expressions in (25) are continuously differentiable functions of rE∅(G, t¯) and rE∅(B, t¯) for rE∅(G, t¯)+rE∅(B, t¯) 6
1. Thus, it is left to show the same for rQ(G, t) and rQ(B, t) for t ∈ S\{t¯}. We proceed using backward
induction. Consider two equalities
WQt|S|−1
(
G, t|S|−1
)
= WQt|S|−1 (G, t¯) ,
WQt|S|−1
(
B, t|S|−1
)
= WQt|S|−1 (B, t¯) .
Given rQ(G, t¯) and rQ(B, t¯), they constitute a system of equations on rQ
(
G, t|S|−1
)
and rQ
(
B, t|S|−1
)
.
Moreover, because w(β) = βα, both rQ
(
G, t|S|−1
)
and rQ
(
B, t|S|−1
)
do not depend on bt|S|−2 – that is, on
strategies rQ(G, t) and rQ(B, t) for t 6 t|S|−2 – but only on rQ(G, t¯) and rQ(B, t¯). Therefore, by the Implicit
Function Theorem, rQ
(
G, t|S|−1
)
and rQ
(
B, t|S|−1
)
are continuously differentiable functions of rQ(G, t¯) and
rQ(B, t¯), which eventually implies that they are continuously differentiable functions of rE∅(G, t¯) and rE∅(B, t¯).
Proceeding backwards we establish the claim for all rQ(G, t) and rQ(B, t) for t ∈ S.
The two following lemmas are mostly technical and provide little intuition for the main problem.
Lemma 13. Suppose
m(x) = (χ1 (a1 + bx)
α
+ . . .+ χk (ak + bx)
α
)
1
α − bx
for k > 2, b > 0,
k∑
i=1
χi = 1, a1, . . . , ak > 0 with ai, aj > 0 for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i 6= j. Then m(x) is
strictly decreasing when α > 1 and is strictly increasing when α < 1.
Proof. Begin by observing that
1
b
· dm(x)
dx
=
χ1 (a1 + bx)
α−1
+ . . .+ χk (ak + bx)
α−1
(χ1 (a1 + bx)
α
+ . . .+ χk (ak + bx)
α
)
α−1
α
− 1.
First, if α > 1 then, since xk is strictly convex for k > 1, we have(
χ1 (a1 + bx)
α−1
+ . . .+ χk (ak + bx)
α−1
) α
α−1
< χ1 (a1 + bx)
α
+ . . .+ χk (ak + bx)
α
, (26)
and therefore dm(x)dx < 0 if α > 1.
Second, if α < 1 then, because xk is strictly convex for k < 0, we still have (26) satisfied. Therefore,
because α−1α < 0, we have
χ1 (a1 + bx)
α−1
+ . . .+ χk (ak + bx)
α−1
> (χ1 (a1 + bx)
α
+ . . .+ χk (ak + bx)
α
)
α−1
α ,
and therefore dm(x)dx > 0 if α < 1.
Lemma 14. Suppose w(β) = βα, and strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} solves either system (22) or system (23).
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Then if α < 1 for any m ∈ {G,B} we have
∂
∂rE∅(m, t¯)
(
(1− zt¯) ·
(
1− rE∅(G, t¯)− rE∅(B, t¯)
)
1− rQ(G, t¯)− rQ(B, t¯)
)
> 0,
while if α > 1 for any m ∈ {G,B} we have
∂
∂rE∅(m, t¯)
(
(1− zt¯) ·
(
1− rE∅(G, t¯)− rE∅(B, t¯)
)
1− rQ(G, t¯)− rQ(B, t¯)
)
< 0.
Additionally, for any m ∈ {G,B} and any t ∈ S we have that WQt1 (m, t) is strictly increasing in rE∅(m, t¯) if
α < 1, and WQt1 (m, t) is strictly decreasing in r
E
∅(m, t¯) if α < 1.
Proof. Lemmas 11 and 12 imply that rQ(m, t) exists for all m ∈ {G,B} and t ∈ S and is continuously
differentiable in rE∅(G, t¯) and rE∅(B, t¯). Next, from (25) we can calculate that
(1− zt¯) ·
(
1− rE∅ (G, t¯)− rE∅ (G, t¯)
)
1− rQ(G, t¯)− rQ(B, t¯) =
MG
(
rE∅ (G, t¯)
) 1
α +MB
(
rE∅ (B, t¯)
) 1
α
(T − t¯+ θ) 1α
+ (1− zt¯) ·
(
1− rE∅ (G, t¯)− rE∅ (B, t¯)
)
,
which is the sum of two functions of the form from Lemma 13 and a constant. Therefore, the first statement
of the Lemma follows directly from Lemma 13.
Next we establish the second claim. By Lemma 12 we can assume without loss that rE∅(G, t¯)+rE∅(B, t¯) <
1. What follows is the proof for the case α < 1 (case α > 1 is analogous). For a given m ∈ {G,B} fix some
rE∅(m, t¯) < r˜
E
∅(m, t¯) and rE∅(−m, t¯) = r˜E∅(−m, t¯). Also denote the respective strategy profiles that solve
system (23) for
[S, rE∅(G, t¯), rE∅(B, t¯)] and [S, r˜E∅(G, t¯), r˜E∅(B, t¯)] as {rγη (m, t)} and {r˜γη (m, t)}. Denote by b
and b˜ the respective beliefs, and by W γt (m, τ) and W˜
γ
t (m, τ) the respective values from reports.
Assume that WQt1 (m, t) > W˜
Q
t1 (m, t). Then r
Q(m, t1) 6 r˜Q(m, t1) for m ∈ {G,B}. From (19) we then
get that bt1 6 b˜t1 . This, in turn, implies that rQ(G, t2) 6 r˜Q(G, t2) and rQ(B, t2) 6 r˜Q(B, t2) because
WQt1 (m, t1) = W
Q
t1 (m, t2) and W˜
Q
t1 (m, t1) = W˜
Q
t1 (m, t2) for m ∈ {G,B}. Iterating this logic further, we get
bt|S−1| 6 b˜t|S−1| . From the first part of the lemma we know that
(1− zt¯) ·
(
1− r˜E∅(G, t¯)− r˜E∅(G, t¯)
)
1− r˜Q(G, t¯)− r˜Q(B, t¯) >
(1− zt¯) ·
(
1− rE∅(G, t¯)− rE∅(G, t¯)
)
1− rQ(G, t¯)− rQ(B, t¯) ,
and therefore WQt1 (∅) < W˜
Q
t1 (∅). This gives us a contradiction with the initial assumption W
Q
t1 (m, t) >
W˜Qt1 (m, t) because we must have W
Q
t1 (∅) = W
Q
t1 (G, t1) and W˜
Q
t1 (∅) = W˜
Q
t1 (G, t1).
Proof of Proposition 4. Part 1. We first show that for any set of parameters |S| = 1, rE∅(G, t¯) > 0,
and rE∅(B, t¯) > 0, the informative equilibrium with given parameters exists. Proposition 2 and the values of
rE∅(m, t) pin down the expert’s strategy. We next show that there exists such a quack’s strategy rQ(m, t¯)
that conditions in Lemma 11 are satisfied, which proves this part of the proposition. Note also that for
singleton S we have zt¯ = F (t).
The first condition one needs to check in order to establish existence is WQt¯ (G, t¯) = W
Q
t¯ (B, t¯), which
can be written as
(T − t¯) · w (β(G, t¯)) + p0wc
(
βG(G, t¯)
)
+ (1− p0)wc
(
βB(G, t¯)
)
=
= (T − t¯) · w (β(B, t¯)) + p0wc
(
βG(B, t¯)
)
+ (1− p0)wc
(
βB(B, t¯)
)
.
(27)
From (17) and (18) we see that the LHS is strictly decreasing in rQ(G, t¯), and the RHS is strictly increasing
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in rQ(G, t¯). Moreover, all six terms in (27) are always positive irrespectively of rQ(G, t¯) because rE∅(G, t¯) > 0
and rE∅(B, t¯) > 0. Therefore when rQ(G, t¯) = 0 the LHS strictly dominates the RHS, and when rQ(G, t¯) = 1
the RHS strictly dominates the LHS. By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists unique rQ(G, t¯) (and
therefore rQ(B, t¯)) such that (27) is satisfied.
If rE∅(G, t¯) + rE∅(B, t¯) = 1 then we are done. Strictly speaking, this is enough to prove the statement.
However, for sake of completeness we show that the equilibrium exists in case rE∅(G, t¯) + rE∅(B, t¯) < 1 as
well. To do this we need to ensure that WQt¯ (G, t¯) = W
Q
t¯ (∅), i.e., that the value of not making a report at t¯
is equal to the value of making a report:
(T − t¯) · w (β(G, t¯)) + p0wc
(
βG(G, t¯)
)
+ (1− p0)wc
(
βB(G, t¯)
)
= (T − t¯) · w (βt¯) + wc (βt¯) . (28)
By the same logic as above, we know that for any given c > 0 there exist unique rQ(G, t¯) and rQ(B, t¯) such
that (27) is satisfied and rQ(G, t¯) + rQ(B, t¯) = c. Further, note that rE∅(G, t¯) and rE∅(B, t¯) that are obtained
as a solution to this auxiliary system are both increasing in c.31 Finally, consider (28) as an equation in c.
From the previous observation it follows that its LHS is decreasing in c, while the RHS is increasing in c.
If c = 0 then the LHS dominates the RHS, and if c = 1 the RHS dominates the LHS. Therefore, by the
Intermediate Value Theorem there exists unique c such that (28) is satisfied. Solving (27) using this c gives
a pair rQ(G, t¯) and rQ(B, t¯) that uniquely solves the original system of (27) and (28).
Part 2. To prove the second part of the proposition we construct a relay reticent equilibrium for a given
S with |S| > 2 and rE∅(G, t¯) = rE∅(B, t¯) = 0. Since states are symmetric, for any t ∈ S the quack is indifferent
between reports (G, t) and (B, t) if and only if rQ(G, t) = rQ(B, t). Thus, we are only left to ensure the
indifference between a report and no report for the quack and to verify that the constructed equilibrium is
incentive compatible for informed expert. Define g := g(G, t1) = g(B, t1). Then W
Q
t1 (G, t1) = W
Q
t1 (B, t1) is
equal to
(T − t1) · w (β0 · eg) + p0wc
(
β0 · pi
p˜0
eg
)
+ (1− p0)wc
(
β0 · (1− pi)
p˜0
eg
)
.
From the expression above we see that the value of g fully determines the value that the quack gets in
equilibrium. In a relay equilibrium the expert’s strategy is fixed, so smaller g means larger rQ(G, t1) and
rQ(B, t1). Larger rQ(G, t1) and rQ(B, t1), in turn, imply higher bt1 . Finally, because the quack must be
indifferent between reports at t1 and t2, higher bt1 implies larger rQ(G, t2) and rQ(B, t2). All in all, it means
that the payoff that the quack receives by not making a report is point-wise strictly decreasing in g. When
g = 0 we have that bt = b0 for all t ∈ T (remember that rE∅(G, t¯) = rE∅(B, t¯) = 0, so following the logic from
Proposition 9 we have g(m, t) = 0 for all t ∈ T ), therefore value of making no report by the end of period T
evaluated at t1 is equal to (T − t1) · w (β0) + wc (β0). When g → −∞ we have that the value of making no
report strictly dominates the value of making a report. When g = 0 we have
(T − t1) · w (β0) + p0wc
(
β0 · pi
p˜0
)
+ (1− p0)wc
(
β0 · (1− pi)
p˜0
)
> (T − t1) · w (β0) + wc (β0)
because wc(·) is convex. Therefore, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a unique g 6 0
such that the quack is indifferent between making a report and not making a report. Finally, because
g(G, t1) = g(B, t1) = g 6 0 we have b(m, t1) 6 b0 6 bt1 . From Proposition 9 for convex wc(·) we know
that it implies that bm(m, t) – and, consequently, ∆wη(m, t) for m = η – are decreasing on S, which verifies
that rEη (η, t) = 1 is an optimal strategy for the expert, i.e., the constructed profile indeed constitutes an
31At least one of rE∅ (G, t¯) and rE∅ (B, t¯) must be higher for a higher c, and (27) implies that higher rE∅ (G, t¯) implies
higher rE∅ (B, t¯).
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equilibrium.
Part 3. To prove the third part assume the contrary: there exists S with |S| > 3 such that informative
equilibrium with respective strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} for t ∈ S exists. By Lemma 10 we can assume without
loss that the equilibrium is a relay one. By Lemma 11 we know that there exists a strategy profile {r˜γη (m, t)}
(and associated belief profile b˜ and value function W˜ γt (m, τ)) for the same S with r˜E∅(G, t) = r˜E∅(B, t) = 0
which solves system (23). We next show that this profile constitutes a relay equilibrium on S. The only
condition that needs to be verified is that this profile is incentive compatible for informed expert. By the
proof of Proposition 9, for S with |S| > 3 this is equivalent to verifying that b˜t1 > b˜(m, t1) for m ∈ {G,B}
because r˜E∅(G, t) = r˜E∅(B, t) = 0.
In the original equilibrium we have bt1 > b(m, t1) by the same Proposition 9. By Lemma 14, because
rE∅(m, t) > r˜E∅(m, t) for m ∈ {G,B} and α < 1, we have WQt1 (m, t1) > W˜Qt1 (m, t1). This implies that
rQ(m, t1) < r˜
Q(m, t1) for m ∈ {G,B}, and therefore b˜t1 > bt1 > b(m, t1) > b˜(m, t1) for m ∈ {G,B}, which
completes the argument.
We have established the existence of the relay equilibrium on S with r˜E∅(G, t) = r˜E∅(B, t) = 0. By
Proposition 9 there exists m ∈ {G,B} such that b˜(m, t1) 6 b0, and therefore
W˜Qt1 (m, t1) 6 (T − t1) · w (β0) + p0wc
(
β0 · pi
p˜0
)
+ (1− p0)wc
(
β0 · 1− pi
p˜0
)
.
At the same time, because in such equilibrium bt > b0 for all t ∈ S (again by Proposition 9), we have
W˜Qt1 (∅) > (T − t1) · w (β0) + wc (β0) .
Finally, W˜Qt1 (m, t1) = W˜
Q
t1 (∅) implies
p0w
c
(
β0 · pi
p˜0
)
+ (1− p0)wc
(
β0 · 1− pi
p˜0
)
> wc (β0) . (29)
If wc(·) is strictly concave then (29) can not be satisfied, which gives us the contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5. Denote by W γt (m, τ) and W˜
γ
t (m, τ) the respective values of making report and
by b and b˜ the beliefs for strategy profiles {rγη (m, t)} and {r˜γη (m, t)}.
To prove the first part of the proposition, we first show that WQt1 (m, t1) 6 W˜
Q
t1 (m, t1) for m ∈ {G,B}.
Assume the contrary, i.e., that WQt1 (m, t1) > W˜
Q
t1 (m, t1) for m ∈ {G,B}.32 Then it directly implies
rQ(m, t1) < r˜
Q(m, t1) for m ∈ {G,B}. From (19) it then follows that bt1 < b˜t1 . This, in turn,
implies that rQ(G, t2) < r˜Q(G, t2) and rQ(B, t2) < r˜Q(B, t2) because W
Q
t1 (m, t1) = W
Q
t1 (m, t2) and
W˜Qt1 (m, t1) = W˜
Q
t1 (m, t2) for m ∈ {G,B}. Iterating this logic further, we obtain that bt < b˜t for all
t ∈ S. Additionally, by Proposition 9 we have btk 6 btk+1 6 . . . 6 btk+n (we can extend the argument
to btk+n because r˜E∅(m, tn+k) = 0 for m ∈ {G,B}). Therefore, WQt1 (∅) < W˜Qt1 (∅). Making no report is
an on-path action in both equilibria, thus WQt1 (G, t1) = W
Q
t1 (∅) and W˜
Q
t1 (G, t1) = W˜
Q
t1 (∅). Consequently,
WQt1 (m, t1) < W˜
Q
t1 (m, t1), which gives us a contradiction with the initial assumption.
Condition WQt1 (m, t) 6 W˜
Q
t1 (m, t) directly implies that r
Q(m, t1) > r˜Q(m, t1) – since in a relay
equilibrium the strategy of the expert is fixed, – and therefore |i(m, t)| 6 |˜i(m, t)| for all t ∈ S. Finally,
|i(m, t)| = 0 for any t /∈ S, meaning that |i(m, t)| < |˜i(m, t)| for t ∈ S˜\S.
32Because WQt1 (G, t1) = W
Q
t1
(B, t1) and W˜Qt1 (G, t1) = W˜
Q
t1
(B, t1), we have that either WQt1 (m, t1) > W˜
Q
t1
(m, t1) for
both m ∈ {G,B} or WQt1 (m, t1) < W˜Qt1 (m, t1) for both m ∈ {G,B}.
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Proofs for Section 6
Proof of Proposition 8. In an ideal equilibrium, rEη (η, t) = 1 and rE∅(m, t) = rQ(m, t) = 0 for
η,m ∈ {G,B} and all t ∈ S. Report (η, t) at t yields maximal continuation reputation to the expert
with information η ∈ {G,B}, so is trivially optimal at the time when he receives his private signal. The
uninformed expert’s preference for staying silent at any t is at least as high as that of the quack (due to the
option value of receiving news in the future and obtaining the maximal continuation payoff). Therefore, it
is enough to verify that the quack prefers to stay silent at every point of the support. Since after any report
the reputation jumps to w¯ := lim
x→+∞w (x) and to w¯
c := lim
x→+∞w
c (x) after state is revealed, in case of no
report it must decrease, as bt is a martingale. Therefore, W
Q
t1 (m, t) is maximized at t = t1 (and any m).
Report (G, t1) and report (B, t1) yield, respectively,
WQt1 (G, t1) = (T − t1) · w¯ + p0 · w¯c,
WQt1 (B, t1) = (T − t1) · w¯ + (1− p0) · w¯c.
We have assumed p0 > 12 , and thereforeW
Q
t1 (G, t1) >W
Q
t1 (B, t1). Using (4), (13), and (14), one can calculate
the flow payoff from staying silent until t, which equals w (β0 (1− F (t))). Therefore, value from not making
a report until the last point of S, as evaluated at t1, equals
WQt1 (∅) =
k=|S|∑
k=1
(tk+1 − tk) · w (β0 (1− F (tk))) + (T − t¯) · w (β0 (1− F (t¯))) + wc (β0 (1− F (t¯))) .
Staying silent is optimal if and only if WQt1 (G, t1) 6W
Q
t1 (∅). This requires that both w¯ and w¯
c to be finite,
while if w(·) or wc(·) is strictly increasing and convex, it must be that w¯ = +∞.
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